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The Modern Case for Withholding 
Kathleen DeLaney Thomas* 
Who is responsible for paying taxes to the government? Currently, the 
answer depends on one’s employment status. Employees enjoy the luxury of 
not having to think about tax remittance during the year because their 
employers withhold taxes from their paychecks. Non-employees, on the 
other hand, face a much more onerous system. They must keep track of and 
budget for taxes during the year, make quarterly remittances to the IRS, and 
may face penalties for failing to do so. Although this regime has been in 
place for many decades, there are several reasons why reform may be in 
order.  
First, the independent contractor workforce is expanding, propelled in 
large part by the growth of the gig economy. This means an increasing 
number of taxpayers are earning income outside of employment that is not 
captured by withholding. Second, the rise of the internet and other advances 
in technology have made withholding by third parties more efficient and 
less costly than was historically the case. Finally, advances in the social 
sciences have shed new light on why many taxpayers appear to prefer 
withholding and why it may serve to enhance overall welfare. 
Accordingly, this Article proposes an expanded withholding regime that 
would condition withholding on the size of the business making the 
payments, rather than on the business’s status as an employer. Under such 
a regime, any business earning over a certain threshold that pays more than 
a de minimis number of workers would be required to withhold taxes. To 
address cases where withholding would not be feasible, this Article also 
introduces the concept of “quasi-withholding.” Quasi-withholding would 
interject a private third party between the taxpayer and the IRS to facilitate 
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tax payments and replicate the benefits associated with withholding. The 
third party could be a financial institution or a private business formed 
specifically to assist with tax remittance. Expanding withholding would 
vastly simplify the tax system for taxpayers, while enhancing revenue 
collection for the government, presenting a rare “win-win” opportunity for 
tax reform. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you buy a house in a new town and need to purchase 
electricity from the local utility company. Further imagine that the 
utility company gives you two options for payment. The first is that you 
can monitor and read your own electricity meter, calculate your bill 
with a formula provided by the utility, and mail the utility company a 
check of roughly $300 once every three months. (Failure to mail the 
check on time or miscalculation of the amount due may result in a late 
payment penalty.) The second option is that the utility company will 
calculate your usage for you, send you a bill each month for roughly 
$100, and allow you the option to have the monthly payment directly 
debited from your bank account. 
For a number of reasons, most people strongly prefer the second 
option. First, research shows that people generally like paying their 
debts sooner rather than later, and they prefer paying in multiple, 
smaller increments as opposed to larger lump sums.1 Paying monthly 
bills via direct debit also likely makes payment less painful for 
consumers, either because they pay less attention to the payment or 
because the automatic and recurring nature of the payment makes it 
easier for them to mentally budget for the loss.2 Finally, the second 
option clearly involves less effort, as the consumer can avoid the time 
and hassle of figuring out her costs and mailing a check. 
The tax system similarly divides taxpayers into two systems of 
payment, although not at the taxpayer’s option. Employees are offered 
something like option two, that is, a simple direct debit system of paying 
taxes. More specifically, employers withhold taxes from their 
employees’ paychecks and remit the tax to the Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) on the employee’s behalf. The employee then files a year-end 
return reconciling the amount withheld with the total tax due and, in 
most cases, claims a refund for the difference.  
Those who earn income outside of employment, such as business 
owners, gig economy workers, and other freelancers, are essentially 
 
 1 See infra Part III.A. 
 2 See infra Part III.A. 
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forced to contend with option one. These taxpayers must budget for 
taxes during the year, calculate estimated taxes, and submit quarterly 
payments to the IRS. Unsurprisingly, the group subject to withholding 
pays taxes in a more accurate and timely manner than the group not 
subject to withholding. Indeed, income tax withholding has proven to 
be one of the government’s most powerful and effective enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure compliance with the tax law.3 
Despite the enormous success of withholding as a tax collection 
mechanism, lawmakers have not expanded its use since it was broadly 
instituted in the first half of the twentieth century.4 Yet there are several 
reasons why such expansion may be in order in the present age. First, 
the independent contractor workforce is expanding, propelled in large 
part by the growth of the gig economy.5 This means an increasing 
number of taxpayers are earning income outside of employment that is 
not captured by withholding. Second, the rise of the internet and other 
advances in technology have made withholding by third parties more 
efficient and less costly than was historically the case.6 Third, advances 
in the social sciences have shed new light on why many taxpayers 
appear to prefer withholding and why it may serve to enhance overall 
welfare.7 
Tax withholding has received little attention in legal literature.8 Yet 
withholding touches upon fundamental questions about how the tax 
system should be administered. Namely, who should be responsible for 
remitting taxes to the government, and who should bear the costs of 
remittance? With these questions in mind, this Article explores the 
normative arguments for and against withholding. It contends that 
many of the arguments previously advanced against the use of 
withholding no longer hold in the modern era. 
One common argument against expanding withholding is that it is 
costly and unfairly burdens the third parties who must assume the cost.9 
 
 3 See, e.g., Ajay K. Mehrotra, American Economic Development, Managerial 
Corporate Capitalism, and the Institutional Foundations of the Modern Income Tax, 73 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 55-56 (2010).  
 4 See infra notes 24–25 and accompanying text (describing enactment of current 
withholding regime during World War II). 
 5 See Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Taxing the Gig Economy, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1415, 
1420, 1430-31 (2018). 
 6 See infra Part II. 
 7 See infra Part III. 
 8 Two notable exceptions are Richard L. Doernberg, The Case Against Withholding, 
61 TEX. L. REV. 595 (1982) and Kyle D. Logue & Joel Slemrod, Of Coase, Calabresi, and 
Optimal Tax Liability, 63 TAX L. REV. 797 (2010). 
 9 See infra Part I.C. 
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However, advances in technology over the past several decades have 
greatly altered the cost-benefit calculus of withholding. In particular, 
the availability of payroll software enables payers to withhold taxes on 
payments to workers at relatively low cost.10 Large businesses likely 
already use such software to compensate non-employee workers. The 
small marginal costs incurred by large payers to add withholding to 
their payroll functions will often be far lower than the aggregate cost of 
imposing tax remittance obligations on each individual worker.  
Another critique of withholding is that it cedes too much power to 
the government, while unfairly depriving taxpayers of the use of their 
funds before taxes are due.11 While these arguments are not without 
merit, critics of withholding have generally failed to take into account 
what research in the social sciences teaches us about taxpayer 
preferences. Specifically, there is ample evidence that taxpayers actively 
prefer withholding and also prefer overpaying their taxes so that they 
can claim a refund at the end of the year.12 Although some 
commentators have argued that such preferences are irrational from an 
economic point of view, when factoring in psychological costs, 
preferences for withholding and overpayment may be perfectly 
rational.13 And since the government also benefits when taxes are paid 
early and accurately, withholding may present a unique “win-win” 
scenario in which the interests of taxpayers and the government align.  
After reexamining the traditional arguments against withholding, this 
Article next offers guidelines for evaluating when withholding is 
warranted. For example, withholding is most likely to be beneficial if a 
single payer transacts with multiple payees in a business setting, 
particularly if the payer is larger and more sophisticated than the 
payees. On the other hand, withholding obligations are likely inefficient 
if imposed on individuals making payments in a personal capacity (a 
homeowner paying a housepainter, for example).  
The Article then offers concrete suggestions for ways policymakers 
should expand withholding, including a proposal for basing 
withholding on the size of the payer’s business. Under current law, the 
obligation to withhold is based entirely on whether the payment is made 
to an employee.14 This system encourages misclassification of workers 
and excludes independent contractors from the benefits of 
 
 10 See infra Part II.A. 
 11 See infra Part I.C. 
 12 See infra Part III. 
 13 See infra Part III. 
 14 See I.R.C. § 3402(a)(1) (2018). 
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withholding.15 A better system, which would expand the number of 
taxpayers able to take advantage of withholding, is to base withholding 
requirements on the profile of the payer, regardless of the payer’s 
relationship with the payee. Such a payer-based withholding regime 
would require withholding on any business-related payment as long as 
the payer: (1) has business receipts over a certain threshold (say 
$100,000) and (2) compensates more than a minimal number of 
workers (say at least 10). For large payers (e.g., a platform company like 
Uber), no determination of employee versus independent contractor 
status would be necessary.  
Withholding by payers is not feasible in all cases, however. Consider, 
for example, a housepainter who paints 100 houses in a year at a cost of 
$500 per job. It would be inefficient to require each individual 
homeowner to withhold taxes for the painter. Acknowledging this fact, 
this Article also introduces the concept of “quasi-withholding” and 
advocates for its use. Quasi-withholding would interject a private third 
party — other than the payer — between the taxpayer and the IRS to 
facilitate tax payments and replicate the benefits associated with 
withholding. The third party could be a financial institution or a private 
business formed specifically to assist with tax remittance. For example, 
a housepainter might open a special business account with a bank where 
she would deposit income from her business. The bank, in turn, would 
deduct a set percentage of every deposit made by the taxpayer for taxes 
and make quarterly remittances on the taxpayer’s behalf.  
The unifying theme among these proposals is that third-party 
remittance is often preferable to an individual remitting her own taxes, 
from both the taxpayer’s perspective and the government’s. And because 
third-party remittance inevitably imposes costs on those third parties, 
this Article also suggests ways the government can and should subsidize 
that cost. In many cases, directly subsidizing third-party withholding or 
quasi-withholding would still result in a net gain for the government 
given the tax collection advantages. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I offers background on the 
U.S. withholding system and surveys past arguments for and against 
withholding to provide historical context for the arguments made 
herein. Part II reexamines the economic costs and benefits of 
withholding in light of advances in technology and the changing nature 
of the economy in the digital age. Part III then overviews research in the 
social sciences that suggests why taxpayers may have preferences for 
 
 15 See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., EMPLOYERS DO NOT ALWAYS 
FOLLOW INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE WORKER DETERMINATION RULINGS 1-2 (June 14, 
2013), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201330058fr.pdf.  
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withholding as opposed to direct remittance. Part IV discusses policy 
implications and argues for expanded withholding rules. Specifically, 
Part IV proposes basing withholding obligations on the size of the 
payer’s business, rather than on the employment relationship. Although 
some have advocated for expanding withholding to particular sources 
of income,16 this Article is the first to suggest basing withholding purely 
on the economic profile of the payer, which is simpler and more 
efficient. Finally, Part IV also proposes that quasi-withholding be 
implemented when withholding is not feasible and discusses its 
implementation. 
I. BACKGROUND ON FEDERAL INCOME TAX WITHHOLDING  
A. History and Overview of Tax Remittance Rules 
The idea of taxing income “at the source,” that is, collecting income 
taxes from the payer rather than the payee, traces back to early 
nineteenth century England.17 After the first British income tax, 
introduced in 1799, was widely considered a failure, it was replaced 
with a regime in 1803 that collected tax on certain forms of income from 
the payer.18 This time around, the tax exceeded revenue expectations 
and was widely hailed as a success.19  
Today, most developed economies collect at least some income tax at 
the source through withholding,20 and the United States is no exception. 
Although withholding was first introduced in a limited form during the 
Civil War,21 its broad application in the United States came about in 
 
 16 See, e.g., Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-222, 
§ 511, 98 Stat. 941 (2005) (3 percent withholding on government payments to 
independent contractors, passed and later repealed); Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (proposal for withholding 
on certain investment income); New Economy Works to Guarantee Independence and 
Growth Act (NEW GIG Act of 2017), S. 1549, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017) (proposing 
5 percent withholding for gig economy workers).  
 17 See PIROSKA E. SOOS, THE ORIGINS OF TAXATION AT SOURCE IN ENGLAND 1-4 (1997) 
(observing that although the first income tax collected at the source originated in 
England in 1803, historians have identified land taxes collected at the source as early as 
the seventeenth century). See id. at 4-5. 
 18 See id. at 2. 
 19 See id. (“This tax was a success, and at 5% it yielded almost as much as the income 
tax of 1799 at 10%.”). 
 20 Joel Slemrod, Does It Matter Who Writes the Check to the Government? The 
Economics of Tax Remittance, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 251, 263 (2008). 
 21 Id. at 262; see also Doernberg, supra note 8, at 599. For a discussion of the early 
history of withholding in the United States, see Ajay K. Mehrotra, ‘From Contested 
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1943, when policymakers were faced with dire revenue needs to fund 
World War II.22 It is during this time that the U.S. federal income tax 
truly became a “mass tax,” one that applied to the general population, 
and not just to businesses and the highest earners.23 To implement such 
a broad scale tax for the first time and ensure that wartime revenue 
needs were met, Congress enacted a system whereby employers would 
withhold taxes on the wage income of their employees.24 As is the case 
today, the 1943 bill did not require withholding for other forms of 
income such as dividends, interest, or independent contractor 
receipts.25 At the time of its enactment, wage withholding enjoyed broad 
popular support, with most surveyed individuals viewing tax payments 
as patriotic support of the government during World War II.26 
1. Current Rules for Employment Income 
Today, the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) continues to require 
employers to withhold income taxes on employees’ wages and remit the 
withheld tax to the IRS. 27 The Code also imposes payroll taxes on 
wages, which are split between employers and employees, each of 
whom pay 7.65 percent (for a combined rate of 15.3 percent).28 
Employers directly remit their half of the payroll tax obligation and they 
 
Concept to Cornerstone of Administrative Practice’: Social Learning and the Early History 
of U.S. Tax Withholding, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L. 144, 151-62 (2016); Charlotte Twight, 
Evolution of Federal Income Tax Withholding: The Machinery of Institutional Change, 14 
CATO J. 359, 367-69 (1995).  
 22 See Slemrod, supra note 20, at 263; see also Doernberg, supra note 8, at 601-02. 
 23 LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO LOVE FORM 1040: TWO CHEERS FOR THE RETURN-
BASED MASS INCOME TAX 71 (2013) (“In 1939 . . . only one American in twenty was an 
income taxpayer or the dependent of an income taxpayer. By the end of the war nearly 
three-quarters of the population was covered by the income tax.”); see also Twight, 
supra note 21, at 370. 
 24 See Doernberg, supra note 8, at 601-02. 
 25 Id. at 601. 
 26 See id. at 602. 
 27 See I.R.C. § 3402 (2018). 
 28 See § 3101(a) and (b) (employee tax comprised of 6.2 percent for Social Security 
plus 1.45 percent for Medicare); § 3111(a) and (b) (same components imposed on 
employer). Additional Medicare taxes (0.9 percent) apply for employees paid more than 
$200,000 per year, and Social Security taxes are not required after a certain wage ceiling, 
which is $132,900 for 2019. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. 
NO. 15, (CIRCULAR E), EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE 23-24 (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p15.pdf [hereinafter I.R.S. PUBLICATION 15]. The employer may also have to pay 
federal unemployment taxes on the first $7,000 of wages at a rate that varies based on 
the amount of state unemployment contributions made. See id. at 36. 
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also withhold the employee’s portion of the payroll tax obligation.29 
Employees receive “credit” for paying withheld taxes regardless of 
whether the employer remits them to the government, while employers 
are fully liable to the IRS for taxes that they are required to withhold.30 
Employers are also subject to harsh penalties for failing to withhold 
taxes.31 
When starting new employment, an employee is required to fill out a 
Form W-4 to indicate her withholding preferences.32 The employer then 
uses this information and an IRS withholding table to calculate the 
amount to be withheld from each paycheck.33 Application of the 
withholding tables results in most employees being slightly 
overwithheld, with the result being that most employees claim a refund 
at the end of the year when they file their tax return.34 
Once they have a W-4 on file with their employer, employees have 
the option to revisit the form and adjust their withholding periodically 
but are not required to do so. Thus, an employee who has worked for 
multiple years for one employer can essentially pay taxes on “autopilot” 
if she chooses, waiting until the end of the year to pay any additional 
balance or (in most cases) claim a refund on her tax return. 
2. Current Rules for Non-Employment Income 
Non-employee workers — such as independent contractors or non-
corporate business owners — are not subject to withholding on their 
earnings.35 Instead, these workers generally must make estimated tax 
payments four times per year36 in addition to paying any tax owed with 
their year-end return. Failure to make quarterly estimated tax payments 
 
 29 See § 3102. 
 30 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.31-1 (2019) (credit to employee); I.R.C. § 3403 (employer 
liability for tax). 
 31 Employers are deemed to hold withheld funds “in trust for the United States,” 
and may be subject to a penalty of 100 percent of the tax for failing to withhold, along 
with other potential penalties. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6672, 7501(a). For a discussion of this 
and other penalties related to withholding, see Doernberg, supra note 8, at 617-22. 
 32 Instructions to Form W-4 indicate that taxpayers may claim various personal 
allowances based on marital status, the child tax credit, and credits for other 
dependents. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FORM W-4 2 (2019), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fw4.pdf. However, taxpayers are not required to do so. 
See id.  
 33 See I.R.S. PUBLICATION 15, supra note 28, at 46. 
 34 Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Presumptive Collection: A Prospect Theory Approach to 
Increasing Small Business Tax Compliance, 67 TAX L. REV. 111, 142 (2013). 
 35 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  
 36 I.R.C. § 6654(c)(2) (2018). 
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can result in the imposition of a tax penalty when the taxpayer files his 
return.37 Non-employee workers must also pay self-employment taxes 
on their net earnings at a rate of 15.3 percent,38 due quarterly.  
Other sources of non-wage income, such as rent, dividends, interest, 
or capital gains, are generally not subject to withholding either.39 
Taxpayers earning significant amounts of such income may also have to 
make quarterly estimated tax payments, although investment income is 
generally not subject to payroll taxes.40 
B. Traditional Arguments for Withholding 
There is an obvious benefit to the government from tax withholding, 
which is that tax compliance is demonstrably higher when it is present. 
The compliance rate on wage income is near perfect at 99 percent, 
meaning that 99 percent of the income tax on wages is reported and 
paid to the government on time.41 In contrast, compliance for self-
employment income, when no withholding or third-party information 
reporting is present, is less than 40 percent. In other words, more than 
the half of the tax due on such income is not paid.42  
Commentators have noted additional benefits from withholding. It 
generally reduces compliance costs for taxpayers and simplifies their 
obligations; at the same time, withholding reduces administrative costs 
 
 37 § 6654(a). To avoid a penalty, total estimated tax payments generally must be at 
least 90 percent of the current year’s tax liability or 100 percent of the previous year’s 
liability. See § 6654(d). However, the penalty doesn’t apply if the amount of taxed owed 
is less than $1,000. See § 6654(e).  
 38 Self-employment taxes apply if an individual earns at least $400 during the year 
from self-employment, at a rate of 12.4 percent for Social Security (subject to the same 
$127,200 cap as for employee wages) and 2.9 percent for Medicare (subject to the same 
additional 0.9 percent for earnings over $200,000). See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TOPIC 
554, SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX (2019), https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc554.html.  
 39 However, certain foreign investors may be subject to backup withholding, under 
which payers must withhold a fixed amount (currently 24 percent) when payees fail to 
provide certain tax information. For a summary of these rules, see INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., BACKUP WITHHOLDING (2019), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-
self-employed/backup-withholding. 
 40 See Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Automation and the Income Tax, 
10 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 3-4 (2018). 
 41 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR THE YEARS 2008-2010 5 n.3 
(2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax%20gap%20estimates%20for%202008% 
20through%202010.pdf [hereinafter I.R.S. TAX GAP ESTIMATES] (showing that income 
subject to withholding has a net misreporting rate of only 1 percent). 
 42 See id. (finding a 63 percent misreporting rate for income subject to little or no 
information reporting). The impact of third-party information reporting on compliance 
is discussed further below. See infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text. 
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for the IRS and speeds up tax collection for the government.43 
Withholding also prevents taxpayers from overspending their wages 
and failing to save enough money for taxes.44 Finally, withholding 
ensures taxpayers pay some tax, even if they fail to file returns, and 
brings taxpayers into the tax system (and onto the government’s radar) 
who may otherwise go completely undetected.45 This also has an added 
benefit to taxpayers in that withholding requires them to pay into Social 
Security when they may otherwise not have done so. 
C. Traditional Arguments Against Withholding 
Notwithstanding these benefits, withholding has not received 
universal support. Milton Friedman, credited for helping develop wage 
withholding in the 1940s, famously announced his regret and called for 
its repeal in later years.46 The problem, according to Friedman, is that 
withholding makes it too easy for the government to collect taxes: by 
making taxation less painful, the government is able to grow larger.47 
Other commentators have also observed that withholding “numbs 
workers to the pain of [paying] their taxes,” making the tax system less 
transparent and therefore less democratic overall.48 Some members of 
Congress have agreed with this sentiment as well, and lawmakers have 
proposed several bills over the last few decades that would repeal 
employee withholding altogether.49  
Legal scholars have also not universally supported withholding. In a 
1982 law review article, Professor Richard Doernberg laid out a case for 
repealing withholding and allowing taxpayers to pay year-end taxes in 
 
 43 Slemrod, supra note 20, at 263; Piroska Soos, Self-Employed Evasion and Tax 
Withholding: A Comparative Study and Analysis of the Issues, 24 UC DAVIS L. REV. 107, 
127 (1990). 
 44 Soos, supra note 43, at 127-30. 
 45 See id. 
 46 See Slemrod, supra note 20, at 251; Zelenak, supra note 23, at 12. 
 47 See Zelenak, supra note 23, at 12 (quoting the testimony of Milton Friedman at 
the Meeting of the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (Mar. 31, 2005)). 
 48 Jonah Goldberg, Automatic Tax Withholding, WASH. POST (May 2, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/liveblog/wp/2013/05/02/outlooks-fifth-annual-
spring-cleaning/. 
 49 See Zelenak, supra note 23, at 12 (describing a proposal by then House Speaker 
Richard Armey in 1996). For proposed bills to repeal withholding on employee wages, 
see Federal Withholding Tax Repeal Act of 2009, H.R. 1919, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); 
Cost of Government Awareness Act of 2001, H.R. 1364, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001); 
Repeal the Withholding of Income Taxes and Require Individuals to Pay Estimated Taxes on 
a Monthly Basis, H.R. 3343, 104th Congress (2d Sess. 1996). 
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a lump sum.50 Doernberg first argues that withholding is inefficient and 
costly. He notes that employers incur costs to compute withholding and 
transmit funds to the government, employees incur costs because they 
do not earn interest on overwithheld funds, and the IRS incurs costs 
from having to process and send taxpayers refunds.51 Next, Doernberg 
argues that withholding has numerous implementation issues. For 
example, it requires the law to distinguish employees from independent 
contractors and creates an incentive to misclassify workers as the 
latter.52  
Finally, Doernberg identifies several philosophical objections to 
withholding. The first is that requiring regular tax payments through 
withholding is contrary to the tax law’s annual accounting concept, the 
idea that taxpayers are liable for their net income computed on an 
annual basis.53 For example, a taxpayer who earns substantial wages in 
the first half of the year will have taxes withheld, even though the 
taxpayer might lose his job, experience deductible losses later in the 
year, and ultimately have no net tax liability.54 Next, Doernberg notes 
that withholding may have a regressive effect because withholding on 
wages, but not on other sources of income (such as investment income 
or self-employment), may force low-income workers to part with their 
funds sooner than higher income taxpayers do.55 A third philosophical 
objection to withholding is “its adverse effects on private savings and 
investment since taxpayers must remit to the government money that 
they might otherwise save.”56 Eliminating withholding, Doernberg 
argues, might lead to greater savings.57 
 
 50 See Doernberg, supra note 8. 
 51 See id. at 604-07. 
 52 See id. at 610-15. Doernberg also argues that withholding creates a situation 
where employers might “misuse the withholding trust funds, most or all of which might 
have been paid directly to the government by the employees in the absence of 
withholding.” Id. at 622. 
 53 Id. at 622-23. 
 54 See id. at 623. 
 55 Id. at 623-24. Doernberg also makes an argument that the withholding tables are 
regressive, in part, because the withholding rates are lower than the top marginal tax rate, 
such that the highest earning employees will pay less of their tax through withholding. Id. 
While this was the case in the 1980s, today’s top withholding rates line up with the top 
marginal rate (37 percent). See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, NOTICE 
NO. 1036, EARLY RELEASE COPIES OF THE 2019 PERCENTAGE METHOD TABLES FOR INCOME TAX 
WITHHOLDING (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/n1036.pdf. 
 56 Doernberg, supra note 8, at 624. 
 57 Id. at 625. 
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D. Revisiting the Case for Withholding 
Congress has made virtually no changes to the withholding rules 
since the 1943 legislation enacting broad wage withholding. Those who 
have advocated for its repeal have not been successful, and at the same 
time, efforts to expand withholding have also failed.58 Yet, there is good 
reason to revisit arguments for and against withholding in the modern 
era. First and foremost, the advances in technology that have taken 
place over the last several decades have fundamentally shifted the cost-
benefit calculus for tax remittance. As discussed below in Part II, many 
of the withholding costs imposed on payers that commentators 
previously identified as burdensome and unfair59 are simply not so 
significant anymore with the availability of software and the Internet. 
At the same time, technology has enabled a growing number of 
individuals to obtain non-employment work via the gig economy.60 This 
growth in non-employee arrangements, fueled by a burgeoning industry 
of online platform companies, has resulted in more workers than ever 
before being subject to tax remittance obligations without 
withholding.61 As discussed in Part IV, the case for expanding 
withholding is often strongest in such a scenario, when a single large 
payer (e.g., a platform company like Uber) pays many individual payees 
(e.g., Uber drivers).  
The rise of technology alone calls into question many of the 
arguments against withholding made by Professor Doernberg and 
others. But an additional reason to reexamine the merits of withholding 
is that there is a growing body of behavioral economics literature that 
sheds light on why taxpayers may actually prefer withholding, even if it 
goes against their pecuniary interests. Past scholarship has generally 
focused only on the economic costs and benefits of withholding.62 By 
incorporating the social science literature into our understanding of tax 
withholding, we can gain a better picture of the overall cost-benefit 
 
 
58
 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.  
 59 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 60 See, e.g., Gig Economy Data Hub, How Many Gig Workers Are There?, ASPEN INST., 
https://www.gigeconomydata.org/basics/how-many-gig-workers-are-there (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2019) (compiling studies from multiple sources and concluding that over 25 
percent of workers participate in “gig” work (i.e., freelancing) in some capacity). 
 61 See Thomas, supra note 5, at 1430-31. 
 62 See Doernberg, supra note 8, at 604-07; Logue & Slemrod, supra note 8, at 830-
49. Logue and Slemrod generally analyze an “optimal tax remittance regime” under 
traditional economic principles. Id. at 800-02. However, they do note that behavioral 
phenomena may impact their analysis and may also have “political economy 
implications.” Id. at 848-49.  
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analysis. If taxpayers prefer withholding and the government can collect 
tax revenue more reliably and efficiently, withholding may present a 
rare win-win scenario in the tax system.  
The next Part of this Article examines the economic costs and benefits 
of withholding in light of advances in technology. It generally argues 
that, in many cases, withholding is the most efficient means of tax 
collection. Part III then explores the various behavioral phenomena that 
explain taxpayer preferences for withholding.  
II. THE ECONOMICS OF WITHHOLDING 
A. Compliance Costs 
If collecting taxes were costless, then policymakers should be neutral 
as between a direct remittance system, where a taxpayer remits her own 
taxes, or a withholding system, where the payer remits the taxes.63 
However, there are costs to remitting taxes (“compliance costs”64), and 
those costs are often higher when borne by the taxpayer payee, as 
opposed to the payer.  
To illustrate, consider a simple example. Assume that X Corporation 
has 10 workers who each earn $10,000 per year for performing 
services.65 Assume each worker has a tax rate of 20 percent, meaning 
they each owe $2,000 in tax on their service income. 
Consider first the direct remittance scenario, in which each worker 
would be responsible for paying his $2,000 of tax liability to the 
government directly. For now, assume that all of the workers report 
honestly. Because income and payroll taxes are generally due 
quarterly,66 each of the 10 workers must make a filing each quarter to 
submit a portion of their tax liability. This will entail time and possibly 
financial cost if the taxpayer uses software or a paid preparer to assist 
 
 63 See Slemrod, supra note 20, at 255-58.  
 64 Compliance costs include time spent by taxpayers dealing with tax obligations 
(research, filling out forms, keeping records, etc.), money spent by taxpayers on tax 
software or tax return preparation services, and costs incurred by third parties like 
employers who must withhold and remit taxes on behalf of employees. See JOEL 
SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 
230-31 (5th ed. 2017). 
 65 It is easier to leave aside the question of whether the workers are employees or 
independent contractors for the sake of this hypothetical, because the former would be 
subject to wage withholding under current law and the latter would not. See supra notes 
27, 35 and accompanying text. 
 66 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ESTIMATED TAXES, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/ 
small-businesses-self-employed/estimated-taxes (last updated June 3, 2019). 
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her in meeting this obligation. For example, it may cost each worker 
$50 and 1 hour of time to meet their tax payment obligations each year. 
If we assume the opportunity cost of one hour of each worker’s time is 
also $50, the total cost would be $100 per worker.67 This cost would be 
separate from, and in addition to, the cost of filing the worker’s year-
end tax return. In this example, the total compliance cost of a direct 
remittance would be $1,000 for ten taxpayers.  
Now consider a withholding system in which X Corporation 
withholds and pays the $2,000 of tax for each worker on a quarterly 
basis. X Corporation may use a payroll software program that charges a 
flat rate (say $100) for any withholding and an additional amount (say 
$10/person) for each worker, for a total cost of $200 in this example of 
ten taxpayers. The additional time incurred may be zero if the software 
withholds based on information already collected for payroll purposes. 
The example, admittedly simplified, illustrates a larger point. In many 
cases, the payer would have declining marginal compliance costs. In 
other words, the payer would have to make a larger initial outlay to 
withhold taxes, but each additional payee would add only a minor cost. 
This is evidenced in the way that software programs generally bill for 
withholding services: most charge a fixed rate for the service with a 
much lower cost per additional employee.68 By comparison, each 
individual payee would incur his or her own individual “start up” cost, 
which would be repeated for every worker.  
The simple example also likely underestimates compliance costs for 
many payees. An employee with a flat tax rate of 20 percent could easily 
calculate the tax due on a quarter’s worth of wages. But, in reality, many 
taxpayers, particularly the self-employed, do not know what their 
overall tax rate will be before the end of the year and might incur 
additional time or resources to make this calculation. Estimating their 
net income for the quarter might also entail additional complexity if 
they incur deductible business expenses.69 
 
 67 One way to measure the value of a worker’s time is based on their foregone income. 
For example, if a worker earns $50/hour from working and must forego one hour of work 
to deal with tax compliance obligations, we can quantify that cost as $50. See, e.g., Erica 
York, TAX FOUND., REVIEWING DIFFERENT METHODS OF CALCULATING TAX COMPLIANCE COSTS 
3 (Aug. 2018), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20180821100528/Reviewing-Different-
Methods-of-Calculating-Tax-Compliance-Costs.pdf. 
 68 See, e.g., Pricing, GUSTO, https://gusto.com/product/pricing (last visited Sept. 27, 
2019); Pricing, ONPAY, https://payrollcenter.com/onpay/costs (last visited Sept. 27, 
2019); Full Service Payroll, PATRIOTSOFTWARE, https://www.patriotsoftware.com/ 
payroll/services/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
 69 However, taxpayers can avoid an estimated tax penalty by basing their estimated 
tax payments on the previous year’s tax liability. See I.R.C. § 6654(d)(1)(B) (2018). 
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The point illustrated by the example is that economies of scale will 
often make withholding by larger payers cheaper than direct remittance 
by payees.70 In addition, larger payers are more likely to have invested 
in technology that minimizes the cost of tax remittance. Returning to 
the example above, when X Corporation hires 10 workers, it might 
invest in payroll software to handle compensation matters. Apart from 
taxes, the software would allow the company to do things like direct 
deposit paychecks, track hours and overtime, and reimburse business 
expenses. Due to these cost-saving advantages, X Corporation might 
invest in the software even without an obligation to withhold and remit 
taxes for its workers. Most payroll software programs, however, would 
also handle tax withholding at no additional cost.71  
This can be thought of as another form of declining marginal cost of 
tax compliance available to larger payers. The first point is that a 
company with multiple workers can remit tax more cheaply than each 
worker remitting her own tax because there is a declining marginal cost 
for each additional worker. But further, large businesses incur 
numerous payroll-related costs apart from taxes, and additional payroll 
functions (like tax withholding) also impose smaller marginal costs. 
Note, this analysis holds whether X Corporation performs these 
functions in house with the help of software or whether it hires an 
outside payroll company. 
In contrast, individual payees may not have comparable investments 
in software or third-party payroll services that would reduce the cost of 
tax remittance. While many individuals use online tax return 
preparation services or similar software,72 those programs generally do 
not handle quarterly estimated tax payments, nor do some tax return 
preparers.73 While financial management software like QuickBooks for 
 
 70 See Logue & Slemrod, supra note 8, at 834. 
 71 Most payroll software programs include tax withholding in their software 
packages. See, e.g., Full-Service, Flexible Payroll, GUSTO, https://gusto.com/product/ 
payroll-features (last visited Sept. 27, 2019); Payroll Software That Does It All, ONPAY, 
https://onpay.com/payroll-software (last visited Sept. 27, 2019); Mike Kappel, What Is 
Withholding for Federal Income Taxes?, PATRIOTSOFTWARE: PAYROLL BLOG (Apr. 12, 
2017), https://www.patriotsoftware.com/payroll/training/blog/what-is-withholding/. 
 72 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-297, TAX ADMINISTRATION: MANY 
TAXPAYERS RELY ON TAX SOFTWARE AND IRS NEEDS TO ASSESS ASSOCIATED RISKS 1 (2009) 
(“In 2007, over 39 million income tax returns were prepared by individuals using 
commercial tax software such as TurboTax, TaxCut, or TaxAct, and more than 66 
percent of those returns were then filed electronically.”). 
 73 For example, the basic tax package from Intuit TurboTax will handle preparation 
of tax forms for individual wage earners subject to withholding by their employers. 
However, if an individual payee wants to calculate and pay their estimated quarterly 
taxes electronically, they must purchase the more expensive QuickBooks Self-Employed 
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individual business owners may help handle tax remittance 
obligations,74 only a minority of self-employed individuals appears to 
use such programs.75 This is not to say that making estimated tax 
payments is prohibitively expensive for individual taxpayers, even when 
they do not use software or online programs to handle accounting 
matters. Rather, the point is that tax remittance obligations incurred by 
individuals are more likely to be standalone costs, which in the 
aggregate, would outweigh the marginal costs incurred by larger payers 
to add withholding to their payroll costs. 
B. Tax Evasion and Other Sources of Nonpayment 
As discussed in the previous section, requiring X Corporation to 
withhold taxes for its 10 workers may impose fewer compliance costs 
than having the 10 employees directly remit their tax liability. Even if 
the government collects identical amounts of tax revenue in either 
scenario, the policy that imposes fewer net social costs is generally more 
desirable.76 However, it is far from clear that the government would 
collect the same amount of revenue in either scenario. Rather, in many 
cases, direct remittance by payees likely results in more tax evasion than 
withholding by payers. Further, direct remittance likely results in more 
unintentional nonpayment of tax as well. 
As discussed above, 99 percent of employee wage income is 
accurately reported to the IRS.77 However, just because an employer 
withholds taxes on wage income for its employees, does not mean the 
funds end up in the government’s hands. Employers could 
misappropriate or otherwise fail to remit withheld tax funds.78 But there 
 
package. See Lisa Lewis, Self-Employed? Don’t Forget About the Estimated Tax Deadline, 
INTUIT TURBOTAX BLOG (Sept. 9, 2019), https://blog.turbotax.intuit.com/self-
employed/self-employed-dont-forget-about-the-estimated-tax-deadline-19852/. 
 74 See, e.g., QuickBooks Self-Employed, INTUIT QUICKBOOKS, https://quickbooks. 
intuit.com/oa/selfemployed/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2019) (stating that the “Self-
Employed Tax Bundle” will allow clients to “[p]ay quarterly estimated taxes online 
directly from QuickBooks” and give clients access to “[o]ne state and one federal tax 
return filing”). 
 75 See Michal Clements, QuickBooks Enjoys 80% Market Share with 29 Million Small 
Businesses but Keeps on Growing, CHICAGONOW, (Apr. 14, 2015, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.chicagonow.com/marketing-strategist/2015/04/quickbooks-enjoys-80-market-
share-with-29-million-small-businesses-but-keeps-on-growing/ (stating that 5 million self-
employed businesses use financial management software while 15 million do not). 
 76 Cf. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 64, at 235. 
 77 See I.R.S. TAX GAP ESTIMATES, supra note 41. 
 78 See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax 
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 731-33 (2007). Professor Lederman explains that 
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are significant penalties intended to deter such mistreatment of 
withheld taxes.79 While some employers do not comply with their 
withholding or remittance obligations, this does not appear to make up 
a significant portion of the tax gap.80 In other words, when withholding 
is imposed under our current system, it appears to be an extremely 
effective way to ensure that the government collects tax owed.  
How does the government fare in situations where there is no 
withholding? It turns out to be surprisingly difficult to evaluate the 
effectiveness of withholding in isolation. This is due to the fact that, 
under the current U.S. system, withholding is always accompanied by 
third-party information reporting. Information reporting refers to the 
reporting of tax information (usually income, but sometimes deductible 
expenses) by third parties to both taxpayers and the IRS.81 For example, 
when a taxpayer earns interest income on her bank account, the bank 
may send her a Form 1099-INT, a copy of which is also sent to the IRS. 
Employees are subject to both information reporting and withholding: 
their employer holds back taxes from each paycheck (withholding) and 
also sends a Form W-2 to the employee and the IRS at year-end 
(information reporting).82  
Information reporting has proven to be a highly effective enforcement 
mechanism. IRS data indicates that income subject to substantial 
information reporting is accurately reported at a rate of 93 percent.83 
This includes income like interest, dividends, pensions, and annuities. 
In contrast, only 37 percent of income not subject to information 
reported is accurately reported to the IRS, including income from self-
employment, farming income, and rental income.84 As explained by 
 
collusion is less of an issue in employer-employee withholding because employers have 
an incentive to report wages that result in a tax deduction. Id. at 729. The issue on the 
employer side tends to be a failure to remit withheld funds, often because the business 
is failing or otherwise needs money. Id. at 732. Professor Lederman further notes that 
such evasion “generally is easier for the IRS to detect without an audit than collusion is 
because the former lacks the employee’s collaboration.” Id. 
 79 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) (2019) (imposing a penalty equal to 100 percent of 
the tax that is willfully unpaid by a party required to withhold). 
 80 For example, only 5.1 percent of the total civil penalties assessed by the IRS in 
2017 were the result of employers’ failing to pay their employees’ withheld taxes. See 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. 55B, DATA BOOK, 2017 42-43 
(2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/17databk.pdf. 
 81 See Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When is 
Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1736-39 (2010). 
 82 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 64, at 275.  
 83 I.R.S. TAX GAP ESTIMATES, supra note 41, at 5 (showing a net misreporting 
percentage of 7 percent for income subject to substantial information reporting). 
 84 See id. 
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Professor Leandra Lederman, information reporting reduces tax evasion 
in two ways.85 One is that it allows for direct detection of noncompliant 
taxpayers. The IRS employs an automated matching program that cross 
checks individual tax returns with information returns.86 For example, 
a taxpayer who reports zero interest income on his tax return, but who 
received a Form 1099-INT showing $1,000 of interest income, would 
be flagged by the IRS’s computer system. Beyond actual detection, 
information reporting also appears to serve as a powerful deterrence 
mechanism.87 Knowing that the IRS is receiving third-party information 
about their income appears to motivate taxpayers to report the vast 
majority of income that shows up on information statements. 
The challenge, then, is determining how much of the near perfect 
compliance rate observed for wage income is attributable to 
withholding and how much is attributable to information reporting 
alone. In isolation, the IRS data suggests nearly all of the compliance 
advantage comes from information reporting: there is a mere 6 
percentage point difference between compliance rates observed for 
(1) withholding and information reporting together (99 percent), and 
(2) information reporting alone (93 percent).88 At first glance, it is easy 
to dismiss the importance of withholding based on these statistics. 
However, the IRS data does not necessarily tell the full story. 
Another way to think about the impact of withholding apart from 
information reporting is by asking the following question: Would we 
observe a 93 percent compliance rate among wage earners if employers 
simply reported wage information to the IRS but did not withhold taxes 
for their employees? The answer is far from clear, and there is good 
reason to doubt compliance would be so high. One important driver of 
the high compliance rates among taxpayers subject to withholding 
appears to be that withholding puts most people in a refund position.89 
In other words, most employees overpay their tax liability through 
withholding and claim a refund at the end of the year when they file 
their tax return. This is relevant because a number of empirical studies 
have shown that taxpayers who claim a refund when they file their tax 
 
 85 See Lederman, supra note 81, at 1738-39. 
 86 SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 64, at 275-76. 
 87 See Lederman, supra note 81, at 1739 (comparing information reporting to “red 
light cameras” that make drivers aware they are being watched). 
 88 See supra notes 77, 83 and accompanying text; see also Lederman, supra note 81, 
at 1736 (“Withholding is well known to be highly effective in ensuring payment, but 
IRS data show that information reporting in the absence of withholding is almost as 
effective.”). 
 89 See Thomas, supra note 34, at 115 n.33.  
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returns are less likely to cheat as compared to taxpayers who owe a 
balance.90  
It is hard to know how much the presence of a refund versus a balance 
due (or “framing”91) impacts observed tax compliance levels in the 
United States. One thing we do know is that the majority of taxpayers 
— nearly 80 percent — claim a refund when they file their tax return.92 
This means that many, if not most, taxpayers earning interest, 
dividends, and other income subject to information reporting are likely 
earning such income in addition to wage income. This also means that, 
in many cases, taxes on income like dividends and interest merely 
reduce taxpayers’ refunds rather than cause a balance to be owed. 
Empirical research suggests that such taxpayers are already likely to 
report honestly, and this likely combines with the already existing 
deterrent effect of information reporting.93  
For example, consider a taxpayer who overpaid taxes on her wage 
income by $3,000 due to withholding. Assume she has received a Form 
1099-INT showing $1,000 of interest income, resulting in $300 of 
additional tax on that interest. If she reports the interest, she will not 
owe a balance when she files her tax return, but rather will reduce her 
refund from $3,000 to $2,700. In this case, IRS compliance data and 
 
 90 See, e.g., Paul Corcoro & Peter Adelsheim, A Balance Due Before Remittance: The 
Effect on Reporting Compliance, in RECENT RESEARCH ON TAX ADMINISTRATION AND 
COMPLIANCE: SELECTED PAPERS GIVEN AT THE 2010 IRS RESEARCH CONFERENCE (2010), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/10rescon.pdf; Richard Dusenbury, The Effect of 
Prepayment Position on Individual Taxpayers’ Preferences for Risky Tax-Filing Options, J. 
AM. TAX’N ASS’N, Spring 1994, at 2; Henk Elffers & Dick J. Hessing, Influencing the 
Prospects of Tax Evasion, 18 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 289 (1997); Henry S.J. Robben et al., 
Decision Frame and Opportunity as Determinants of Tax Cheating, 11 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 
341 (1990). 
The results of these studies can be explained by prospect theory. The decision-making 
theory, developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, posits that individuals tend 
to view outcomes as either gains or losses relative to a neutral reference point, a 
phenomenon known as “framing.” See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect 
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 272-73 (1972), 
reprinted in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 17, 27-28 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky eds., 2000). Prospect theory predicts that individuals facing a gains frame tend 
make risk-averse choices, while those facing a loss frame tend to exhibit risk-seeking 
behavior. Id. at 22-23. 
 91 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 92 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 64, at 276. Additionally, 86 percent of all 
personal federal income tax liability is collected through withholding. Id. See also 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. 1304, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 
RETURNS COMPLETE REPORT 6-10, Table A (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p1304.pdf; Thomas, supra note 34, at 115 n.33. 
 93 See Thomas, supra note 34, at 116 n.34. 
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research on refunds both indicate that the taxpayer is highly likely to 
report the interest income accurately.  
This may not be the case, however, for a taxpayer not already owed a 
refund. Imagine, instead, a self-employed taxpayer who owes the IRS 
$3,000 of tax on her business income when she files her tax return. 
Assume this taxpayer also earned $1,000 of interest on which she owes 
an additional $300 of tax. On the one hand, deterrence theory predicts 
that the taxpayer will pay the $300 in tax due on the interest because 
she will (rightfully) fear getting caught if she does not. On the other 
hand, she may be more tempted to underreport because she is already 
facing a loss,94 and empirical studies indicate taxpayers in her position 
are more likely to cheat. One strategy she might employ is to report the 
$1,000 interest income, but to (falsely) report $1,000 less in taxable 
business income, so that her total tax liability remains $3,000.  
The larger point here is that it is difficult to untangle the deterrent 
effect of information reporting from the framing benefit offered by 
withholding. If there is significant overlap between taxpayers who claim 
refunds and taxpayers who report income subject to information 
reporting but not withholding, then there is reason to believe that at 
least some portion of high compliance is due to framing effects 
combined with the deterrent effect of information reports. It follows, 
then, that if withholding were completely eliminated, such that virtually 
no taxpayers claimed refunds, compliance even in the presence of 
substantial information reporting would decline.  
Even without the presence of a refund, a recent empirical study 
suggests withholding encourages better tax compliance.95 The study 
involved businesses in Costa Rica that were subject to sales tax 
withholding by credit card companies.96 For the vast majority of 
businesses, additional sales tax was due with the return (i.e., taxpayers 
did not claim refunds).97 The study’s authors examined the impact of a 
2011 legal reform that roughly doubled the rate of sales tax withholding 
by the credit card companies to determine how it affected overall tax 
compliance by the businesses.98 The impact of the withholding change 
was significant: among taxpayers whose withholding rates increased, 
 
 94 Prospect theory would predict that the taxpayer would be more willing to take a 
risk if she was facing a loss. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 90, at 22-23. 
 95 See Anne Brockmeyer & Marco Hernandez, Taxation, Information, and 
Withholding: Evidence from Costa Rica (Feb. 7, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). 
 96 The study looked at both corporations and self-employed individuals. Id. at 3. 
 97 See id. at 30-31 n.53. 
 98 Id. at 27. 
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total tax remittances increased by 39 percent.99 In other words, 
withholding more tax resulted in more tax being paid overall. 
Again, these taxpayers were not claiming refunds, but instead had a 
portion of their tax withheld and paid another portion in connection 
with a sales tax return. Perhaps counterintuitively, the government’s act 
of increasing the withheld portion of the tax due resulted in taxpayers’ 
paying more sales tax overall, even though taxpayers could have held 
their overall tax remittance constant by reporting less tax due with their 
return. But the businesses did not appear to make these adjustments, 
nor did they avoid the use of credit card machines to escape the extra 
withholding.100 
Taken together, the Costa Rican study and the studies on tax refunds 
suggest that withholding reduces tax evasion and has a positive impact 
on voluntary compliance. This sheds doubt on whether compliance 
levels would stay above 90 percent if we eliminated withholding but 
retained information reporting for taxpayers like employees. Further, 
unintentional noncompliance would likely become a much bigger issue 
than it is now in the absence of withholding. Specifically, without 
withholding, many taxpayers would likely fail to budget properly for 
taxes and simply not have the cash on hand to meet their tax 
obligations. This is a well-documented issue for smaller independent 
contractors such as gig economy workers.101  
Concededly, unintentional noncompliance does not appear to be an 
issue for taxpayers receiving interest, dividends, and other similar 
income subject to information reporting but not withholding, as such 
income has a 93 percent compliance rate.102 But there are two potential 
explanations that suggest this compliance level would not necessarily 
apply if withholding were repealed altogether. One is the point made 
 
 99 Id. at 29-30. 
 100 See id. at 28, 31. The authors suggest two reasons for the response to the 
withholding increase. First, some taxpayers simply failed to claim credit for the extra 
withholding on their tax returns, so the increased remittance was merely a “default” 
effect. Id. at 32-33. But for many others, there was a true increase in reported tax 
liability, even though credit was claimed for taxes withheld. Id. at 33. For these 
taxpayers, the authors suggest an increase in the perception of enforcement is the most 
likely explanation. Id. at 33-34. Even though actual audit rates did not change, perhaps 
these taxpayers viewed the change in withholding policy as a signal that the government 
was more closely monitoring sales tax compliance. See id.  
 101 See, e.g., Caroline Bruckner, Shortchanged: The Tax Compliance Challenges of Small 
Business Operators Driving the On-Demand Platform Economy, KOGOD TAX POL’Y CTR. 11 
(May 2016), http://www.american.edu/kogod/news/shortchanged.cfm; Thomas, supra note 
5, at 1420, 1430-31. 
 102 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
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above that high compliance for things like interest and dividends might 
be driven, in part, by the framing effects created by tax refunds. 
But even putting aside framing, taxpayers who earn the type of 
income subject to substantial information reporting, largely investment 
income like interest, dividends, and annuities, likely earn more income 
and are more liquid than the average taxpayer. While some taxpayers103 
might earn investment income in a tax-advantaged account like a 
401(k) or an Individual Retirement Account (“IRA”), those savings 
vehicles do not generate taxable income before withdrawal.104 The 
taxpayers receiving Form 1099 with significant amounts of taxable 
investment income — like interest, dividends, and annuities — are a 
smaller, wealthier number.105 For those taxpayers, budgeting and 
liquidity issues are less likely to be an obstacle when they file their tax 
return. In other words, we can expect wealthier taxpayers who earn 
taxable investment income subject to information reporting to be able 
to afford to pay their tax bills. We might not have the same expectations 
about less wealthy workers who earn wages or other income if 
withholding is not present. 
There are no serious proposals at present to repeal withholding for 
wage earners.106 The purpose of considering the consequences of repeal 
is to try to evaluate how important withholding is in isolation. One 
potential critique of the argument that withholding promotes tax 
compliance is that much, if not all, of the benefit we observe from 
withholding merely comes from the information reporting that 
accompanies it. However, withholding likely has valuable compliance 
benefits that are completely independent of information reporting. In 
sum, a withholding system likely results in better compliance, i.e., less 
 
 103 Fewer than half of households aged 55 and older have any retirement savings. 
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-419, RETIREMENT SECURITY: MOST 
HOUSEHOLDS APPROACHING RETIREMENT HAVE LOW SAVINGS 7 (2015); see also James M. 
Poterba, Steven F. Venti & David A. Wise, Were They Prepared for Retirement? Financial 
Status at Advanced Ages in the HRS and AHEAD Cohorts 40 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 17824, 2012) (explaining that 46 percent of households die with 
less than $10,000 in assets). 
 104 See, e.g., 401(k) Plan Overview, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/ 
retirement-plans/plan-participant-employee/401k-resource-guide-plan-participants-401k-
plan-overview (last visited Sept. 30, 2019). 
 105 See Arthur B. Kennickell, Ponds and Streams: Wealth and Income in the U.S., 1989 to 
2007 25 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. and Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2009-13, 
2009), https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200913/200913pap.pdf. 
 106 But see supra note 49 (citing bills to repeal withholding proposed in 1996, 2001, 
and 2009). 
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tax evasion, than a direct remittance system, even if information 
reporting is present. 
C. Enforcement Costs 
Yet another cost that will often be lower in the presence of tax 
withholding is that of government enforcement. To ensure that income 
taxes are paid in an accurate and timely manner, the government must 
expend resources to audit taxpayers and to prosecute and/or penalize 
offenders.107 Consider, again, the example of X Corporation that pays 
10 workers for services, each of whom earns $10,000 and owes $2,000 
of tax. In a direct remittance system, the IRS would have to monitor 
each worker’s compliance with their $2,000 tax obligation, along with 
monitoring X Corporation’s compliance with its own tax obligations. In 
contrast, a withholding system allows the IRS to monitor a smaller pool 
of people; in this example, the government could monitor X 
Corporation alone to account for all of the tax due. (Although 
technically the X Corporation workers could still underreport their tax 
liability even in the presence of withholding, the data tells us this 
generally does not happen.108) And not only is it cheaper to audit fewer 
taxpayers, auditing X Corporation is likely less costly than auditing 
individuals, because X Corporation is more likely to have well-kept 
books and records as compared to the individual workers.109  
In the absence of withholding, the government must not only audit 
and penalize offenders, but it also must educate taxpayers about their 
tax obligations to encourage timely payment. Quarterly estimated tax 
obligations are confusing for many taxpayers, and the IRS has devoted 
increased resources in recent years to educate taxpayers about how to 
stay compliant in the absence of withholding.110 On the other hand, 
taxpayers who remit their taxes through withholding will inevitably 
need less assistance and education.  
Finally, as noted by Professors Kyle Logue and Joel Slemrod, direct 
remittance may result in higher enforcement costs because individual 
taxpayers are more likely to be judgment proof than large payers.111 In 
the absence of withholding, some (possibly many) taxpayers will 
inevitably fail to remit their tax liability and ultimately the government 
 
 107 See Thomas, supra note 5, at 1430. 
 108 See I.R.S. TAX GAP ESTIMATES, supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 109 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 64, at 276; Logue & Slemrod, supra note 8, at 
837-38. 
 110 See, e.g., I.R.S News Release IR-2016-110 (Aug. 22, 2016).  
 111 See Logue & Slemrod, supra note 8, at 837. 
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will have to attempt to collect it. To the extent some taxpayers spend 
their money as they earn it and do not have any savings or assets, the 
government will be unable to collect.112 The government generally can 
avoid this issue when it collects taxes through withholding. Not only is 
it less likely that the IRS encounters a judgment-proof problem from a 
larger payer,113 but it does not have to engage in costly procedures like 
liens or levies114 to collect the tax owed.  
In sum, there are several reasons why withholding may cost far less, 
from an economic standpoint, than direct remittance. Particularly when 
a larger entity pays multiple, smaller payees, both compliance costs and 
IRS enforcement costs will likely be lower in a withholding system. This 
is because large payers will usually incur declining marginal compliance 
costs for additional payees and have sophisticated software already in 
place for payroll and recordkeeping, which in turn makes them easier 
to audit. On the other hand, individual payees are less likely to have 
payroll software in place and compliance and enforcement costs must 
be replicated for each taxpayer. Additionally, studies show evasion is 
generally lower when withholding is present.115  
III. SOCIAL SCIENCE SUPPORT FOR WITHHOLDING 
Part II argued that withholding is often more cost-effective as 
compared to direct remittance from an economic perspective. This Part 
now turns to an independent justification for withholding derived from 
social science research. Specifically, it examines why individuals may 
prefer withholding to direct remittance, and argues that the former may 
enhance overall welfare. 
A preference for withholding is somewhat counterintuitive because, 
from a time value of money perspective, withholding puts taxpayers at 
a disadvantage compared to direct remittance. One reason is that 
withholding results in taxes being paid earlier: withholding generally 
applies every time taxpayers are paid, often bi-weekly, whereas 
estimated taxes paid directly by taxpayers are due only once per quarter. 
 
 112 See id. 
 113 Of course, even large corporations could also go bankrupt and become judgment-
proof. See id. 
 114 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. 594, THE IRS 
COLLECTION PROCESS (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p594.pdf. 
 115 On the other hand, withholding is less likely to be cost-effective in the case of 
payments between individuals of similar income level and sophistication. Withholding 
is also less likely to be effective when collusion is likely to be present, i.e., when neither 
party to the transaction has an incentive to report the transaction to the IRS. These 
general principles are discussed below in Part IV. 
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The other reason is that most taxpayers subject to withholding overpay 
their taxes during the year and claim refunds, and those refunds do not 
bear interest.116 Thus, under a withholding system, the government 
benefits because it is able to collect tax sooner117 and has use of 
taxpayers’ additional funds, interest free. Economic theory would 
predict, then, that governments should prefer withholding (assuming it 
is can be accomplished in a cost-effective manner) and taxpayers should 
resist withholding. Instead, taxpayers should want to control their 
funds as long as possible, earn interest on those funds, and remit tax as 
late as possible.  
Yet, surprisingly, numerous studies reveal this is not the case as far as 
taxpayers are concerned.118 Instead, withholding presents a rare 
instance in which the government’s and the taxpayer’s interests often 
align. It appears that many taxpayers prefer to make advanced 
payments, rather than retaining their funds as long as possible. And it 
further appears that taxpayers prefer overpayments. Although it could 
be argued that these preferences are irrational from an economic point 
of view, when factoring in psychological costs, they may be perfectly 
rational. The sections below explore social science research that sheds 
light on why many taxpayers may display preferences for withholding 
instead of direct remittance.  
Part III.A describes research that examines preferences regarding 
payments of debt. In general, this research reveals that people like to 
pay debts sooner rather than later, and that they prefer making multiple 
small payments as opposed to fewer large payments. Together, these 
findings support the notion that many taxpayers would prefer 
withholding from each paycheck as opposed to quarterly estimated 
taxes, and certainly as compared to making a single lump sum payment 
at year-end. Part III.B then examines preferences for overwithholding, 
that is, not just paying taxes through withholding, but paying more tax 
than what is due and claiming a refund at year-end.  
 
 116 See Thomas, supra note 34, at 115 n.33. 
 117 Although employers don’t necessarily remit tax to the IRS at the same time that 
they withhold tax from their employees’ paychecks, withheld taxes must be remitted to 
the government either monthly or semi-weekly, whereas estimated tax payments are 
due only quarterly. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Employment Tax Due Dates, 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/employment-tax-due-
dates (last visited July 20, 2018). 
 118 See, e.g., studies cited infra notes 137, 164, 180 (observing individual preferences 
for frequent payments of debt and for overpayments accompanied by refunds). 
  
2019] The Modern Case for Withholding 107 
A. Withholding and the Psychology of Paying 
Paying taxes is psychologically painful. Research suggests that 
Americans do not like the way the government spends their money, that 
they worry that rich people do not pay enough in taxes, and that they 
generally exhibit “tax aversion.”119 But apart from the fact that tax 
payments may evoke one’s negative views about the tax system, paying 
taxes represents a true economic loss that is painful in any event. 
Numerous studies by psychologists and economists confirm the fairly 
intuitive fact that, in any context, paying is painful.120 However, 
research also suggests that certain forms of payment appear to mitigate 
the pain of paying. When it comes to paying taxes, these mitigating 
factors are far more likely to be present in the context of withholding as 
opposed to direct remittance.  
1. Advanced Payments Versus Debt 
Empirical studies show that many people prefer to pay their debts 
sooner rather than later, even though economic theory predicts that 
they should want to defer financial obligations as far into the future as 
possible.121 For example, in one survey, more respondents preferred to 
prepay for a vacation rather than pay an identical amount after the 
vacation, despite “an implicit interest penalty of about $50.”122 In other 
words, even though people could earn interest on their funds if they 
delayed payment for the vacation, and would not owe interest by 
delaying payment, they preferred to pay sooner anyway. 
One potential explanation for this preference is “debt aversion.”123 It 
appears that the idea of debt is psychologically painful and people tend 
to enjoy getting rid of it as quickly as possible.124 For example, a person 
might enjoy their vacation more if the thought of paying for it is not 
hanging over them during the trip, even though they could have earned 
 
 119 See, e.g., Christopher C. Fennell & Lee Anne Fennell, Fear and Greed in Tax 
Policy: A Qualitative Research Agenda, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 75, 75-76 (2003); Yair 
Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like to Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support for Government 
Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 179, 179 (2013). 
 120 See, e.g., Drazen Prelec & George Loewenstein, The Red and the Black: Mental 
Accounting of Savings and Debt, 17 MARKETING SCI. 4, 4 (1998) (describing the “pain of 
paying”). 
 121 See, e.g., George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal 
Choice, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 181, 182 (1989). This assumes people do not owe interest on 
the debt that exceeds their rate of return on investments; if so, paying sooner is rational. 
 122 Prelec & Loewenstein, supra note 120, at 6. 
 123 Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 121, at 187. 
 124 See Prelec & Loewenstein, supra note 120, at 5. 
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some interest if they paid later. The foregone interest might be worth 
the extra psychological enjoyment of not thinking about the debt. 
Similarly, consumers generally enjoy token systems that allow for 
prepaying, such as casino chips or drink tokens at a resort.125 
Individuals also commonly pay off debt like student loans earlier than 
required, even if the interest rate is lower than what they could 
otherwise earn on their investments.126 
In the context of making tax payments, withholding likely has appeal 
for people who are debt-averse. As discussed above in Part II, 
withholding taxes from each paycheck allows taxpayers to make tax 
payments sooner and, for most, allows them to avoid year-end balances.  
Although people who pay quarterly estimated taxes can also aim to 
overpay their taxes and avoid a year-end balance, this form of payment 
may feel more like psychologically painful debt for several reasons. 
First, estimated tax payments are generally made less frequently, so the 
prospect of a tax bill looms over the taxpayer for several months at a 
time. Second, it may be harder to avoid a balance due with estimated 
taxes because taxpayers may be unsure of their final tax liability.  
2. Small Payments Versus Large Payments 
In addition to paying debts early, splitting a large payment into 
multiple smaller payments appears to reduce the psychological pain of 
paying. Studies show that, in general, individuals prefer to segregate a 
larger loss into smaller losses that occur apart in time. For example, in 
one study, subjects were asked to contemplate a situation where a 
person received two tax bills totaling $150: one bill from the federal tax 
authority for $100 and another bill from the state tax authority for 
$50.127 A majority surveyed indicated that it would be more desirable to 
receive the letters two weeks apart rather than receiving the letters on 
the same day.128 The authors of the study found similar results, i.e., a 
desire to segregate losses into different time periods, for both large and 
small losses and both monetary and non-monetary losses.129  
 
 125 See id. at 19.  
 126 Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 121, at 187. 
 127 Richard H. Thaler & Eric J. Johnson, Gambling with the House Money and Trying 
to Break Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice, 36 MGMT. SCI. 643, 649 
(1990). 
 128 See id. 
 129 See id. 
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Another study also found that subjects prefer to separate financial 
losses into different days, whether the loss was large or small.130 The 
study’s authors suggest that the preference to segregate losses may be 
attributable to limited “loss buffering resources.”131 Under this theory, 
individuals have limited mental resources to cope with loss. While one’s 
mental resources may be consumed by one loss, the passage of time 
replenishes those resources, allowing the person to better cope with a 
second loss.132 
Marketers have capitalized on similar findings in the context of 
consumers. Research has shown that framing a larger payment as a 
collection of very small “pennies-a-day” payments makes a consumer 
transaction more attractive.133 One well-known example is the 
marketing campaign of the Christian Children’s Fund, in which Sally 
Struthers urged viewers to feed a starving child for only 70 cents a 
day.134 Other studies similarly confirm that individuals are significantly 
more likely to donate funds to a worthy cause when a payroll deduction 
is framed as 85 cents per day versus $300 per year, and they are willing 
to pay more for a magazine subscription framed as a per-issue price 
versus a total annual price.135  
Tax withholding similarly allows taxpayers to break up their tax 
payments into smaller payments that are spaced apart in time. Like the 
subjects in the study who preferred to pay a $100 federal tax bill on a 
different day than a $50 state tax bill,136 taxpayers may experience less 
psychological loss from paying their income taxes this way.137  
 
 130 Patricia W. Linville & Gregory W. Fischer, Preferences for Separating or 
Combining Events, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 18 (1991). Large financial losses 
involved losing an airline ticket worth $250 and incurring $200 worth of damage to a 
stereo system; small losses involved losing a book that had just been purchased for $5 
and losing a $5 bill. Id. at 22. 
 131 See id. 
 132 See id. at 9. 
 133 John T. Gourville, Pennies-a-Day: The Effect of Temporal Reframing on Transaction 
Evaluation, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 395, 395 (1998). 
 134 See id.; see also Mycommercials, Sally Struthers Christian Children’s Fund Commercial 
(1987), YOUTUBE (Oct. 26, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePENcrE_xcQ. 
 135 Gourville, supra note 133, at 396. In the study, subjects were asked to report a 
fair price; the average per issue price selected was $1.47, which resulted in an annual 
price of $76.25, while the average annual price selected was just $38.65. Id. at 396. 
 136 See Thaler & Johnson, supra note 127, at 649. 
 137 Cf. Valrie Chambers & Anthony P. Curatola, Could Increasing the Frequency of 
Estimated Tax Payments Decrease Delinquency Rates Among The Self-Employed?, 20 
ADVANCES TAX’N 1 (2012) (observing that when presented with the option, subjects 
generally preferred monthly as opposed to quarterly tax payments, and monthly 
payments resulted in better tax compliance). 
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On the other hand, the tax system does not offer self-employed 
taxpayers, or other taxpayers not subject to withholding, an easy 
method to break up their tax liability into many small payments. A 
disciplined taxpayer may be able to self-impose such a system by 
moving a fixed, small amount into a separate bank account each time 
he receives a paycheck. But there is no good evidence that most 
taxpayers exhibit this self-control.138 Further, even taxpayers who 
manage to save money from each paycheck for taxes in small increments 
must then make a larger, lump sum payment to the IRS for quarterly 
taxes. Overall, the fact that individuals prefer to segregate losses likely 
makes withholding more desirable than direct remittance for many 
individuals.  
3. Flat Payments 
Consumers also appear to prefer making flat, predictable payments as 
compared to variable payments, even if they ultimately pay more in the 
former scenario.139 For example, a study of internet customers revealed 
that they generally preferred pre-paying for services at a flat monthly 
rate, as opposed to paying for their actual internet use each month.140 
Survey responses from the consumers revealed several explanations for 
the flat rate preference. First, the flat rate was viewed as “insurance” 
against the risk of incurring higher than expected costs based on actual 
usage.141 Second, consumers report enjoying their internet usage more 
if they are not worrying about costs increasing with every minute used, 
the so called “taxi meter effect.”142 (The taxi ride is thought to be less 
enjoyable if one must watch the meter ticking away.143) Finally, the 
 
 138 See Richard H. Thaler & H. M. Shefrin, An Economic Theory of Self-Control, 89 J. 
POL. ECON. 392, 392 (arguing that individuals, embodying conflicting economic roles 
as “farsighted planners” and “myopic doers,” generally lack adequate self-control to 
exhibit good saving behaviors).  
 139 See Anja Lambrecht & Bernd Skiera, Paying Too Much and Being Happy About It: 
Existence, Causes, and Consequences of Tariff Choice Biases, 43 J. MARKETING RES. 212, 
212 (2006). 
 140 See id. at 215. The study found that “more than half of the consumers with a flat-
rate bias paid at least 100% more than they would have paid on the least costly tariff.” 
Id. 
 141 Id. at 221-22 (summarizing findings); see id. at 213 (describing the “insurance 
effect”). 
 142 Id. at 221-22 (summarizing findings and survey questions); see id. at 213-14 
(describing the “taxi meter effect”). 
 143 See id. at 214. 
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study found that consumers simply overestimate their actual internet 
usage.144  
In the context of internet usage, the study reveals consumers are 
willing to pay a premium to simply not have to worry about how much 
they will owe in a given month. This is consistent with other research 
indicating that paying is psychologically painful and that individuals are 
generally debt-averse. In the same way that advanced payments make a 
vacation more enjoyable, it appears that regular fixed payments (as 
opposed to variable payments) also reduce psychological discomfort.  
Although withholding often does not necessarily involve a flat tax 
payment, taxes are often withheld at a fixed rate. There may also be a 
“taxi meter effect” when it comes to paying taxes. Just as flat utility rates 
allow consumers to enjoy services without constantly worrying about 
payment, regular withholding may allow taxpayers to derive more 
pleasure out of their paycheck as compared to receiving higher gross 
payments that they know will later be subject to taxes. Similarly, the 
“insurance effect,” whereby internet users display preferences to pay 
higher flat rates to insure against surprising losses, is consistent with 
taxpayers’ overall preferences (discussed further below) to overpay their 
taxes to avoid a large balance. 
4. The Endowment Effect and Mental Accounting  
Withholding may also make paying taxes less painful because 
taxpayers do not view withheld taxes as a loss but, rather, as money that 
was never theirs to begin with,145 an extension of the so-called 
“endowment effect.” In essence, the endowment effect describes the 
idea that we value an item that we own (i.e., an item that is part of our 
endowment) more highly than we would value the same item if we did 
not own it.146 Studies of the endowment effect show, for example, that 
subjects demand a much higher price to sell a mug or a pen that they 
 
 144 See id. at 214, 221-22. 
 145 See, e.g., EYAL ZAMIR, LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND MORALITY: THE ROLE OF LOSS 
AVERSION 156 (Oxford Univ. Press 2015) (“A taxpayer who receives a taxable income 
and then pays the tax plausibly experiences the payment as a loss. In contrast, when the 
tax is deducted at the source, the taxpayer is much more likely to regard her net 
payment as the reference point, thus framing the deducted tax as an unobtained gain.”); 
Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. REG. 253, 
277 (2011). 
 146 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 293 (2011). 
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own, as compared to the price that other subjects are willing to pay to 
acquire the same mug or pen.147  
The endowment effect offers another potential explanation as to why 
taxpayers may prefer withholding instead of direct remittance. When 
taxes are withheld, taxpayers are never in possession of the withheld 
funds. Logically, then, taxpayers may not view withheld taxes are part 
of their “endowment,” which means they may not experience a 
psychological loss at all from the tax payment.148 In other words, if a 
taxpayer’s reference point is her net pay, then the taxes do not represent 
a psychological loss at all.  
On the other hand, it may be more difficult for taxpayers not subject 
to withholding to avoid experiencing a psychological loss from paying 
taxes. Paying taxes quarterly out of the taxpayer’s own funds is more 
likely to evoke the endowment effect and make the experience painful. 
However, whether a taxpayer experiences a loss from direct remittance 
may depend on whether the taxpayer has kept a mental account for 
taxes.  
The idea of mental accounting, famously described by economist 
Richard Thaler, is that we tend to separate our resources into different 
“accounts” in our minds that serve different purposes, such as savings, 
spending money, and money that is earmarked for certain purchases.149 
Mental accounting explains why, for example, a person might spend an 
unexpected cash gift of $1,000 on a vacation but spend an annual salary 
increase of $1,000 on household bills.  
Mental accounting may allow people to shift their reference points for 
purposes of determining gain and loss.150 For example, if a person 
anticipates a $500 bill is due, but has mentally budgeted for that amount 
in advance, payment of the bill may not feel like a psychological loss at 
all. This may be because the person has shifted their reference point 
from zero to a $500 loss, in which case the payment of $500 is a non-
event.  
Similarly, taxpayers who are not subject to withholding may keep 
mental accounts for taxes, such that their reference point is set at a 
 
 147 See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests 
of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1342-46 (1990). 
 148 Cf. Logue & Slemrod, supra note 8, at 848-49 (discussing the possible impact the 
endowment effect may have on labor supply when workers do not have taxes withheld).  
 149 See Richard Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCI. 
199, 199-201 (1985). 
 150 See Nathan Novemsky & Daniel Kahneman, The Boundaries of Loss Aversion, 42 
J. MARKETING RES. 119, 127 (2005) (“Budgeting intentions distinguish between within-
budget expenditures, which are not treated as losses, and extrabudget expenditures, 
which evoke loss aversion.”). 
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certain amount of tax liability (rather than zero). For example, a self-
employed taxpayer may believe she likely owes $10,000 of tax to the 
IRS in a particular year. Each quarter, she knows she must set aside 
$2,500 for estimated taxes. If she has mentally budgeted that $2,500 of 
her income will go to a mental “tax account,” the payments may not feel 
like a loss. Instead her reference point would be $2,500 each quarter. In 
that case, owing additional tax with her tax return might evoke a loss, 
but it would be a loss measured against a $10,000 reference point, not 
zero. For example, owing an additional $2,000 ($12,000 of tax liability 
total) at year-end would feel like a $2,000 loss, not a $12,000 loss.  
Evidence on whether taxpayers successfully keep these kinds of 
mental accounts is mixed. One study that interviewed self-employed 
taxpayers found that “some taxpayers seem to keep a separate mental 
tax account to put aside money for their tax due. Others tend to 
integrate taxes and other costs and revenues, resulting in the feeling of 
ownership for the whole gross income . . . .”151 A later study found that 
taxpayers’ tendency to segregate taxes into separate mental accounts 
was positively correlated with age and experience.152 Those that tended 
to mentally budget for taxes were, unsurprisingly, more likely to report 
honestly, had more positive views about paying taxes, and were less 
likely to experience liquidity problems.153 
In sum, even though it is certainly possible for taxpayers to mentally 
account for taxes in a way that makes direct remittance as painless as 
withholding, empirical evidence suggests that many taxpayers do not 
do this. Rather, it appears many people experience a psychological loss 
in connection with tax payments, either because they do not mentally 
account for taxes or because they do so incorrectly. This is more likely 
to be the case with an inexperienced taxpayer who is not able to 
adequately predict her tax liability. On the other hand, taxpayers subject 
to withholding do not have to keep mental accounts for taxes, because 
they are unlikely to have to make any tax payments from their own 
funds.  
 
 151 Stephan Muehlbacher & Erich Kirchler, Mental Accounting of Self-Employed 
Taxpayers: On the Mental Segregation of the Net Income and the Tax Due, 69 
FINANZARCHIV 412, 433 (2013). 
 152 Stephan Muehlbacher, Barbara Hartl & Erich Kirchler, Mental Accounting and Tax 
Compliance: Experimental Evidence for the Effect of Mental Segregation of Tax Due and 
Revenue on Compliance, 45 PUB. FIN. REV. 118, 135 (2017). The earlier study also found 
a positive correlation with age. See Muehlbacher & Kirchler, supra note 151, at 429. 
 153 See id. at 134-35. 
  
114 University of California, Davis [Vol. 53:81 
5. Salience 
Yet another feature of withholding is that it makes taxes less salient 
to taxpayers, which may influence behavior or perceptions of the tax 
system. Salience in this context generally refers to the visibility of a 
tax.154 In general, the more salient a tax, the more taxpayers will react. 
In a seminal study of tax salience, researchers found that when sales 
taxes were included in the posted purchase price of an item at a store 
(i.e., the tax was highly salient), people were less likely to buy the 
item.155 On the other hand, when taxes were not included on the price 
tag but instead only showed up at the register (i.e., lower salience), the 
tax had significantly less impact on purchase decisions.156 Interestingly, 
people tended to ignore sales taxes when they were not included in the 
posted price even though surveyed consumers generally had knowledge 
about sales tax rates.157  
Paying estimated taxes is highly salient; the cost is visible because 
taxpayers must remit the tax directly. In contrast, wage withholding 
may function somewhat like sales taxes that are imposed at the register 
only, i.e., they may have low salience. Although an employee has access 
to gross wage and tax information on her paystub, not having to make 
a tax payment reduces the salience of the tax.158 This is particularly true 
for taxpayers who receive direct deposits of their earnings, who may not 
even look at their paystubs on a regular basis. This lower salience may 
reduce the pain associated with paying taxes and/or promote more 
positive attitudes about paying taxes.159  
 
 154 See Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and 
Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145, 1146 n.2 (2009); David Gamage & Darien Shanske, 
Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 
23 (2011) (“‘[T]ax salience’ refers to the extent to which taxpayers account for the costs 
imposed by taxation when the taxpayers make decisions or judgments.”). 
 155 See Chetty, Looney & Kroft, supra note 154, at 1146 (finding that purchases 
declined by about 8 percent when the tax was included in the price tag). 
 156 See id. 
 157 See id. at 1147. 
 158 Gamage and Shanske note that there are several possible explanations for why 
withholding might reduce salience. Besides allowing taxes to be paid before taxpayers 
receive their paychecks, they point out that withholding also breaks up large tax 
payments into regular, smaller payments, which may also reduce salience. See Gamage 
& Shanske, supra note 154, at 41-42.  
 159 Some commentators have argued that this lower salience is a negative attribute 
of withholding. See infra Part IV. 
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B. Withholding as a Mechanism for Overpayment 
There are many aspects of tax withholding that align with individuals’ 
preferences for how they like to pay debts. Part A above described 
preferences to pay debts early, make multiple small payments, and 
minimize variation in payments. Additionally, withholding reduces the 
salience of taxes and likely helps taxpayers mentally account for taxes 
in a way that minimizes the psychological loss. All of these features of 
tax withholding apply regardless of whether a taxpayer claims a refund. 
As long as a taxpayer does not owe a significant balance with her return, 
withholding likely makes paying taxes less painful compared to direct 
remittance. 
Additionally, and separately from these aforementioned features of 
withholding, paying taxes through withholding often results in an 
overpayment, which is returned to the taxpayer through a tax refund. 
Indeed, most taxpayers in the United States claim refunds when they 
file their tax return.160 Empirical studies indicate this, too, appears to 
align with taxpayer preferences. And although taxpayers who remit 
taxes directly could also overpay and claim a refund, there is no default 
mechanism in place that ensures this happens and it is likely harder and 
less common for taxpayers to do so. 
The preference to overpay taxes and claim a refund is consistent with 
what Thaler calls the “silver lining” effect, i.e., the preference to 
accompany a loss with a small silver lining. Recent empirical research 
has shown that consumers do, in fact, often prefer to overpay debts and 
have the overpayment refunded to them. Additionally, a number of 
studies have examined the preference for overpayments specifically in 
the context of tax withholding. The subsections below describe those 
studies and explore additional explanations for why taxpayers may 
prefer refunds.  
1. The Silver Lining Effect 
Studies show that many people prefer paying a larger total amount 
accompanied by a small refund, compared to paying slightly less and 
receiving no refund. Economist Richard Thaler described this 
phenomenon as the “silver lining” principle.161 In other words, losses 
are easier to cope with if accompanied by a small silver lining. 
 
 160 See Thomas, supra note 34, at 115 n.33 (finding that nearly 80 percent of 
taxpayers overall and over 90 percent of wage earners claim a refund). 
 161 Thaler, supra note 149, at 202. 
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An empirical study of the silver lining effect showed that, indeed, 
when presented with hypothetical gambles, subjects preferred a small 
gain paired with a larger loss (e.g., a loss of $60 paired with a gain of 
$5) as opposed to an equivalent loss with no gain (e.g., a loss of $55).162 
Subjects were more likely to prefer segregation of a loss with a gain if 
the loss was large and the gain was small.163  
A more recent study examined the phenomenon in the context of 
advanced payments for utilities in Germany.164 Germany requires utility 
customers to make monthly, fixed advanced payments for utilities based 
on the utility company’s estimate of their annual consumption.165 At the 
end of the year, customers either receive a refund for any amount 
overpaid or a bill for the remaining balance due.166 Because the utility 
company cannot make perfectly accurate predictions about usage, 
roughly half of customers overpay and half underpay.167  
The authors of the study surveyed utility consumers to gauge their 
preferences for underpayments versus overpayments. First, they found 
that, when presented with hypothetical options about refund and 
payment scenarios, most consumers preferred to overpay and receive a 
refund versus owing a balance.168 The more uncertain their utility 
consumption was ahead of time, the stronger the preference was to 
overpay and claim a refund.169 Participants even preferred refunds when 
the refund scenario had a higher total bill than the balance due scenario; 
in other words, they were willing to pay slightly more overall to have a 
refund.170  
Second, the study found that utility users who had received refunds 
were more likely to recommend their utility provider as compared to 
those who owed a balance, indicating higher satisfaction among those 
 
 162 See Peter Jarnebrant, Olivier Toubia & Eric Johnson, The Silver Lining Effect: 
Formal Analysis and Experiments, 55 MGMT. SCI. 1832, 1838-39 (2009). 
 163 See id. at 1839.  
 164 See Fabian Schulz, Christian Schlereth, Nina Mazar & Bernd Skiera, Advance 
Payment Systems: Paying Too Much Today and Being Satisfied Tomorrow, 32 INT’L J. RES. 
MARKETING 238, 238-39 (2015). 
 165 Id. at 238. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Although the study’s authors did not analyze the entire universe of consumers, 
in a sample of over 700, approximately half (381) received refunds and half (398) owed 
a balance. Id. at 245. Customers generally do not have a zero balance because the utility 
company’s predictions are never perfectly accurate. See id. 
 168 Id. at 243.  
 169 Id. at 243-44.  
 170 Id. at 243. 
  
2019] The Modern Case for Withholding 117 
who received refunds.171 Finally, those with refunds were less likely to 
switch utility companies as compared to those who owed a balance, 
again indicating an overall preference for refunds.172 
In sum, multiple studies indicate that people prefer a larger payment 
accompanied by a refund, as compared to a slightly smaller payment 
and no refund. The preference is so strong that, in some cases, people 
are even willing to pay a premium (i.e., to pay more overall) for that 
refund. One potential explanation is Thaler’s notion of the silver lining 
effect. In the case of taxpayers, there are several additional explanations 
for why they might prefer refunds, as well. A preference for refunds may 
be a reaction to uncertainty about taxes owed, or taxpayers may view 
refunds as a commitment device that helps them save. Or, as one 
commentator has suggested,173 the prevalence of refunds may not reflect 
preferences at all, but rather may just be a default effect of the IRS 
withholding tables. The following section reviews studies on 
overwithholding and examines potential explanations offered by 
scholars for why the phenomenon is so frequently observed.  
2. Evidence of Taxpayer Preferences for Overwithholding 
One possible reason that taxpayers may prefer to overwithhold during 
the year is that they are uncertain what their final tax liability will be 
and they prefer to err on the side of caution.174 This is not necessarily 
an irrational response, given that taxpayers may face a penalty for 
under-withholding.175  
Taxpayers who are subject to withholding, but who withhold too 
little during the year and owe a significant balance with their tax return, 
face the same estimated tax penalties that those not subject to 
withholding do. Specifically, taxpayers who do not prepay either (1) 90 
percent of their current year’s tax liability or (2) 100 percent of their 
 
 171 See id. at 247. Customers who had claimed refunds also demonstrated lower 
awareness about prices, which is linked to higher customer satisfaction. See id. at 247. 
Customers tend to be more aware of prices when they are unsatisfied and are searching 
for alternatives. See id. at 244. 
 172 The final part of the study looked at actual churn rates among consumers who 
had received refunds and those who had made payments and found those who had 
received refunds were less likely to switch companies. Id. at 248. 
 173 Damon Jones, Inertia and Overwithholding: Explaining the Prevalence of Income Tax 
Refunds, 4 AM. ECON. J. 158, 160 (2012). 
 174 See, e.g., Jannett Highfill, Douglas Thorson & William V. Weber, Tax 
Overwithholding as a Response to Uncertainty, 26 PUB. FIN. REV. 376, 376 (1998). 
 175 Id. at 387-88. 
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prior year’s tax liability may be subject to an estimated tax penalty.176 
The penalty is a fixed percentage of the tax due, generally calculated as 
the “federal short-term rate” (which tracks current interest rates177) plus 
3 percent.178 For example, in April 2018, the federal short-term rate was 
approximately 2 percent, making the penalty rate for failure to pay 
estimated tax 5 percent of the unpaid tax.179  
On the other hand, the upside for the taxpayer for delaying payment 
of her tax, i.e., the interest she can earn on those funds, is often lower.180 
In April of 2018, the yield on a 6-month Treasury bill was not quite 2 
percent.181 This means that, if a taxpayer set aside $1,000 to invest 
instead of paying it to the IRS, she might earn interest of about $20 pre-
tax and something short of that after tax.182 But, she would owe the 
government 5 percent — or $50 — for paying it late, which would be 
 
 176 I.R.C. § 6654(d) (2018). However, there is no penalty if the tax owed with the 
return is less than $1000 or if the individual had no tax liability the previous year. 
§ 6654(e)(1)-(2). 
 177 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES & 
GIFTS ¶ 116.2 n.11 (2019).  
 178 § 6654(a) (referring to the underpayment rate set by I.R.C. § 6621). Section 6621 
sets the underpayment rate at 3 percent plus the “federal short-term rate” as determined 
by the IRS. § 6621(a)-(b). The rate is higher for large corporations. § 6621(c). 
 179 See Rev. Rul. 2018-07, 2018-13 I.R.B. 445 (Mar. 26, 2018); see also I.R.S. News 
Release IR-2018-43 (Mar. 7, 2018). 
 180 But some taxpayers’ foregone opportunity cost may be higher than the Treasury 
rate because the funds could have been used to pay off high-interest debt. See Donna D. 
Bobek, Richard C. Hatfield & Kristin Wentzel, An Investigation of Why Taxpayers Prefer 
Refunds: A Theory of Planned Behavior Approach, 29 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 93, 94 (2007). 
For example, a taxpayer who owes credit card debt bearing 20 percent interest may be 
better off (economically) by paying the debt sooner and incurring tax penalties for late 
tax payments. See id. Another possible cost to overpaying taxes, in addition to foregone 
interest, is that “tax professionals may charge more for tax returns resulting in refunds.” 
Id. at 95. 
 181 See Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-
rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yieldYear&year=2018  (last visited July 11, 2019) 
(listing the daily yield for 6-month Treasury bond rate at 1.92 percent for April 2, 2018). 
 182 Although taxpayers can make tax-favored investments (e.g., a 401(k) or an IRA 
account), generally these investments cannot be made on a short-term basis. See, e.g., 
401(k) Resource Guide - Plan Participants - General Distribution Rules, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/plan-participant-employee/401k-resource-
guide-plan-participants-general-distribution-rules (last visited Oct. 1, 2019) (describing 
conditions for distributions from a 401(k) plan and penalties for early distributions). 
Taxpayers may also make riskier investments (e.g., a stock purchase) that yield a higher 
return than Treasury bills; however, this is likely more difficult to do on a short-term basis, 
as well. See, e.g., Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity 
Premium Puzzle, 110 Q.J. ECON. 73, 83-84 (1995) (showing stock portfolios outperform 
bonds over the long term but not on a short-term basis). 
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nondeductible for tax purposes. Because the penalty on tax 
underpayments is keyed off of short-term interest rates plus 3 percent, 
the penalty is generally always going to be higher than the taxpayer’s 
own rate of return if she invests the funds on a short-term basis. Given 
the disparity among these rates of return, and the inevitable uncertainty 
about how much tax will be due for many taxpayers, some scholars have 
suggested the choice to overwithhold is perfectly rational.183 
In reality, the choice to overwithhold to avoid penalties depends more 
on taxpayers’ perceptions about those penalties than on the actual rate 
of the penalty. Taxpayers may perceive penalties to be harsher than they 
are and withhold more accordingly. Aside from their perceptions about 
economic costs, taxpayers may also experience a psychological cost to 
owing underpayment penalties, which may encourage them to 
overwithhold. The psychological cost may arise from the fear of being 
subject to a penalty or fear of interactions with the IRS in general.184 It 
may also simply be a psychological cost from owing an additional 
payment at all with the tax return, which would be consistent with the 
concept of debt aversion discussed above.185  
Other scholars have suggested that so many people overpay their 
taxes during the year because IRS withholding tables generally default 
to overwithholding, and transaction costs for overcoming such defaults 
 
 183 See Highfill et al., supra note 174, at 390. Highfill, Thorson, and Weber model a 
taxpayer’s decision to overwithhold under uncertainty and find that, given that the 
“penalty for underwithholding exceeds the opportunity cost of withholding, it is 
optimal for taxpayers to overwithhold.” Id. at 376. The authors conclude that their 
model “substantially explain[s]” the rate of overwithholding in the United States. Id. 
However, a subsequent critique of their paper finds that “penalty avoidance” explains 
only a fraction of overwithholding rates in the United States, and that other factors must 
also influence the propensity of taxpayers to claim refunds. See Ashvin Gandhi & 
Michael Kuehlwein, Reexamining Income Tax Overwithholding as a Response to 
Uncertainty, 44 PUB. FIN. REV. 220, 222 (2016). Notably, Gandhi and Kuehlwein point 
out that Highfill, Thorson, and Weber fail to account for the fact that taxpayers who 
face estimated tax penalties could also invest their funds and earn interest before paying 
the penalty. See id. at 228-30. Thus, the effective cost of the penalty is not the penalty 
itself, but the penalty minus the taxpayer’s (after-tax) rate of return. In the example 
above in the text, a taxpayer facing a $50 estimated tax penalty on $1,000 of tax would 
be able to offset that with her earnings from investing the $1,000. However, these 
earnings would likely be subject to tax. Assuming a 20 percent tax rate, a taxpayer might 
net $16 ($20 minus $4 in tax) on her $1,000 short-term investment. This makes her 
effective penalty $34 ($50 minus $16), rather than $50, which still exceeds her rate of 
return on the investment.  
 184 Cf. Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, The Psychic Cost of Tax Evasion, 56 B.C. L. REV. 
617 (2015) (describing various psychological costs of tax evasion).  
 185 See supra Part III. 
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may be high.186 A taxpayer who wants to change her withholding must 
fill out a new Form W-4 for her employer, which may be confusing and 
will require time and effort. One study of IRS data found that taxpayers 
generally do not bother to change their default withholding even when 
their circumstances change, which appears to suggest that either 
economic or psychological costs may be a barrier.187  
The fact that overwithholding is a default for many taxpayers188 
suggests that at least some people may not prefer it, but instead simply 
perceive the transaction costs to be too high to opt out. But other 
research indicates that overwithholding is still preferable for many 
people, regardless of defaults and transaction costs. For example, one 
empirical study presented participants with a hypothetical scenario 
involving a taxpayer expecting a $1,500 year-end refund.189 The 
hypothetical taxpayer was given the option, mid-year, to reduce his tax 
withholding by $250 per month in lieu of receiving a refund.190 The 
study participants were told the taxpayer would have to go to his 
employer and adjust his Form W-4 to do so.191 The participants were 
then asked how likely they would be to adjust their withholding if they 
were in the shoes of the hypothetical taxpayer, and were also asked 
multiple questions about the reason underlying their (hypothetical) 
withholding decision.192  
On average, the survey participants indicated that they would be 
unlikely to adjust their withholding, and that they would rather receive 
a refund.193 This is consistent with the study describing withholding as 
a default effect. However, the two most prominent explanations for the 
respondents’ desire to keep their refund were: (1) that they would enjoy 
a refund more than extra monthly income, and (2) that the refund 
 
 186 See, e.g., Benjamin C. Ayres, Steven J. Kachelmeier & John R. Robinson, Why Do 
People Give Interest-Free Loans to the Government? An Experimental Study of Interim Tax 
Payments, 21 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 55, 56 (1999) (“Even if taxpayers understand the rules, 
an individual taxpayer’s time value of money for interim tax remittances may not exceed 
transaction costs. For example, the process of fine-tuning IRS Form W-4 to override 
default withholding rules is cumbersome and inconvenient.”); see also Bobek et al., 
supra note 180, at 94. 
 187 See Jones, supra note 173, at 159. 
 188 The IRS withholding tables are designed to intentionally overwithhold tax. See 
Thomas, supra note 34, at 142, n.180. 
 189 See Bobek et al., supra note 180, at 100. 
 190 See id. 
 191 See id. 
 192 See id. 
 193 See id. at 109. Overall, 67 percent of respondents indicated that they would not 
reduce their refund. Id. 
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would reduce the uncertainty about owing tax at the end of the year.194 
As to the latter point, the respondents generally indicated concern about 
owing an unexpected sum of money at the end of the year and not 
having sufficient funds to pay it.195 On the other hand, subjects did not 
appear to view the time or effort involved in changing the Form W-4 to 
be a major contributing factor to their decision.196 
In terms of why respondents would enjoy getting a refund, the 
authors of the study asked participants how they would spend the 
$1,500 refund versus how they would spend the extra $250/month from 
the withholding adjustment.197 People were most likely to spend a 
refund on a vacation, whereas people were most likely to spend extra 
monthly income on paying bills,198 which is consistent with the concept 
of mental accounting discussed above.199 The authors concluded that 
the tendency to spend a refund on more enjoyable consumption items 
likely contributes to positive views about refunds in general.200 
Another study surveyed participants to examine tax payment 
preferences in both withholding and direct remittance systems.201 
Subjects were assigned to either a withholding (employee) scenario or 
a quarterly estimated taxes (independent contractor) scenario. They 
were then told a certain amount of tax — $16,000 — would be due, and 
that they could choose to pay that exact amount, more, or less during 
the year.202 Subjects were also told that the minimum amount of 
advanced tax payments that had to be made to avoid a penalty was 
$12,000.203 In other words, subjects could withhold or pay quarterly 
estimated taxes equal to their entire tax bill and owe nothing at year-
 
 194 See id. at 99. 
 195 See id. 
 196 See id. at 106. 
 197 See id. at 107. 
 198 Id. Spending money on vacation was ranked highest for how people would use 
the $1,500 refund (53.6 percent) and lowest for how people would use $250 of 
additional monthly earnings (19.3 percent). Id. On the other hand, paying off bills was 
ranked the highest for the use of additional monthly earnings (50 percent) and lowest 
for use of a refund (32.9 percent). Id. 
 199 See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 200 See Bobek et al., supra note 180, at 108 (“These results suggest that many 
taxpayers ‘enjoy’ getting a refund because of what they spend it on.”). 
 201 See Ayres et al., supra note 186, at 55. 
 202 Id. at 63. Within the two scenarios, participants were further separated into 
“relative certainty” and “relative uncertainty” conditions. Id. at 62. The latter introduced 
uncertainty as to the total amount of tax due, but not as to the minimum amount due 
to avoid a penalty. Id. Unsurprisingly, subjects opted to prepay significantly more tax 
in the uncertainty conditions as compared to the certainty conditions. Id. at 65, 72. 
 203 See id. at 64. 
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end, or they could pay only $12,000 on an advanced basis and owe 
$4,000 at year-end, but with no penalty. The study’s authors 
intentionally designed this question to remove the confusion that may 
influence tax payment behavior in the real world, and to remove the 
transaction costs (e.g., the hassle of making withholding elections).204  
Notwithstanding these diminished obstacles,205 nearly half (43 
percent) of subjects still chose to pay the entire tax liability and not 
retain a portion until the end of the year.206 In other words, even though 
they knew they would not be penalized, a substantial portion of the 
participants did not want to owe any money to the IRS at the end of the 
year. The authors concluded that factors other than transaction costs 
and confusion must drive preferences to pay more than the minimum 
amount of tax due to avoid a penalty.207  
Interestingly, preferences were not significantly different between the 
withholding group and the estimated taxes group; both generally 
preferred not to owe significant additional tax at year-end.208 The 
authors concluded that in both the case of withholding or estimated 
taxes, “the taxpayer who remits taxes at the minimum today faces the 
unappealing prospect of anticipating a delayed payment of tax due 
later.”209 Further survey questions revealed that subjects were 
concerned about lacking liquid funds to pay a large year-end balance, 
and that some did not trust themselves to invest the extra funds in an 
interest-bearing account.210 
That nearly half of participants preferred not owing money at the end 
of the year is revealing, because the study intentionally removed 
transaction costs and the element of uncertainty associated with not 
knowing how much tax would be owed.211 Many taxpayers appear to 
have a significant aversion to owing a balance with their tax return, even 
if they can predict what that balance will be. In reality, taxpayers face 
 
 204 See id. at 62. In addition to removing these factors, the authors noted that the 
study participants (MBA students) were educated and familiar with time value of money 
principles. See id.  
 205 Confusion was eliminated by specifying the amount due to avoid a penalty; 
however, the total tax due was uncertain in some conditions. See id. (explaining the 
uncertainties introduced to participants in the study).  
 206 Ayres et al., supra note 186, at 64. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. at 67 (finding that “the form of outlay did not significantly affect 
preferences”).  
 209 Id. at 68. The authors also noted that the propensity to overpay decreases as 
taxpaying experience increases. Id. 
 210 See id. at 66-67. 
 211 See id. at 56. 
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both transaction costs to change their withholding elections and 
uncertainty. This indicates that in the real world, preferences for 
overwithholding are likely even higher than the percentage in the study. 
And since it is nearly impossible for taxpayers to predict their final tax 
liability with complete certainty, we can expect many will want to err 
on the side of overpayment versus underpayment. This is supported by 
the study on overpayments for utility usage,212 in which participants 
who did not know what their year-end bill would be preferred to err on 
the side of overpayment. 
Finally, some studies indicate that taxpayers may prefer 
overwithholding because they view a tax refund as a form of forced 
savings plan. Taxpayers who otherwise wish to save may lack the self-
control to do so during the year, and overwithholding allows additional 
money to be kept out of their reach until they receive their refund, 
which may help fund the purchase of a durable good like a car or 
appliance.213  
The overall effect of withholding on consumption and savings is 
unclear, and likely depends, in part, on how taxpayers mentally account 
for tax refunds. Several studies have examined how taxpayers treat 
annual lump sum refund payments versus smaller interim payments. 
The general takeaway is that people appear more likely to spend smaller 
interim payments and more likely to save a lump sum refund, although 
savings may take the form of purchasing a durable good.214 For 
example, one such study found that when a $300-$600 tax refund was 
paid out monthly over the course of a year, the refund was more likely 
to be spent on monthly expenses instead of saved.215  
Another study examined a 1992 stimulus, which reduced taxpayers’ 
withholding to produce larger paychecks, which in turned produced 
 
 212 See supra notes 164-172 and accompanying text. 
 213 See Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 138, at 401. See generally Michael S. Barr & Jane 
K. Dokko, Paying to Save: Tax Withholding and Asset Allocation Among Low- and 
Moderate-Income Taxpayers (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. and Econ. Discussion Series, 
Working Paper No. 2008-11, 2008), https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/ 
200811/200811pap.pdf (examining taxpayer preferences for overwithholding and 
concluding that withholding operates in part as a self-control device for lower income 
taxpayers to help them save). 
 214 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Romich & Thomas Weisner, How Families View and Use the 
EITC: Advance Payment Versus Lump Sum Delivery, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 1245, 1258-59 
(2000) (discussing refunds as a forced savings mechanism among EITC recipients).  
 215 See Valrie Chambers & Marilyn Spencer, Does Changing the Timing of a Yearly 
Individual Tax Refund Change the Amount Spent vs. Saved?, 29 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 856, 
861-62 (2008). This was true for smaller refunds ($300 to $600). See id. at 860. Larger 
refunds ($3,000 to $6,000) were more likely to be saved regardless of how they were 
paid. See id. 
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smaller year-end tax refunds. The study found that reducing the lump 
sum refund in this manner resulted in lower savings in IRAs as 
compared to when refunds were larger.216 But another study found that 
taxpayers were more likely to spend federal stimulus payments on 
consumption when paid as a larger lump sum as compared to small 
additions to each paycheck,217 indicating that refunds may encourage 
consumption rather than savings.  
Regardless of whether overwithholding results in more spending or 
more savings, taxpayers may prefer it because of how they mentally 
account for refunds. As commentators have suggested, it may be that 
overwithholding helps taxpayers save up funds to purchase important 
consumer durables.218 Or, taxpayers may view refunds as a windfall that 
they feel more comfortable spending on a leisure purchase, like 
vacation.219  
In sum, numerous studies indicate that taxpayers prefer receiving 
refunds, even though they do not earn interest on refunds. This 
preference is likely due to a multitude of factors such as debt aversion, 
uncertainty, and perhaps a desire to save. Withholding helps put most 
taxpayers in a refund position because the withholding tables generally 
default to overpayment. In contrast, it may be harder for taxpayers not 
subject to withholding to overpay their taxes during the year, either 
because they have difficulty estimating what is due, or because they lack 
the self-control to make overpayments to the IRS. It is likely particularly 
difficult for those paying estimated taxes to make overpayments because 
those overpayments are likely to be made in larger sums (due only 
quarterly) and are thus more salient and painful than small additional 
amounts being withheld from each paycheck. Thus, while withholding 
is not a prerequisite for receiving a tax refund, taxpayers are probably 
more likely to overpay and claim a refund if they are subject to 
withholding. 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Parts II and III reexamined the benefits of withholding from a 
traditional economic perspective and a behavioral economics 
 
 216 See Naomi E. Feldman, Mental Accounting Effects of Income Tax Shifting, 92 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 70, 86 (2010).  
 217 See Claudia R. Sahm, Matthew D. Shapiro & Joel Slemrod, Check in the Mail or 
More in the Paycheck: Does the Effectiveness of Fiscal Stimulus Depend on How It Is 
Delivered?, 4 AM. ECON. J. 216, 217 (2012). 
 218 See Chambers & Spencer, supra note 215, at 861 (finding that consumers spend 
10 percent of their refund, on average, on consumer durables). 
 219 See Bobek, supra note 180, at 108. 
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perspective. From a pure cost-benefit standpoint, withholding may be 
the most efficient method for the government to collect taxes in many 
circumstances, particularly in light of technological advances. 
Additionally, for many individuals, withholding may enhance welfare 
due to the psychological pain of making infrequent, lump sum tax 
payments. Accordingly, this Part begins by revisiting the historic 
objections to withholding and argues that many of those objections are 
now obsolete.  
This Part then considers specific policy implications. Part IV.B argues 
that withholding should be expanded beyond employment, offers 
guiding principles for doing so, and identifies particular settings where 
withholding would be particularly beneficial. Part IV.C then proposes 
that “quasi-withholding” be implemented when regular withholding is 
not feasible. As discussed further below, quasi-withholding would 
utilize private third parties to facilitate tax payments from the taxpayer 
to the government in a manner that replicates many of the psychological 
benefits of withholding. 
A. Revisiting Objections 
Many of the objections to withholding discussed in Part I are less 
relevant today than they were several decades ago. Payers can withhold 
at a lower cost than ever before with the use of payroll software, and the 
IRS can often avoid processing refund checks through the mail through 
the use of electronic direct deposit. Further, due to the expansion of the 
gig economy in the last decade (discussed further below), there is a 
growing number of arrangements where large payees compensate many 
smaller non-employee workers. Additionally, a plethora of recent 
empirical research demonstrates why taxpayers tend to prefer 
withholding.  
However, not all of the arguments raised by Doernberg and other 
commentators are addressed by these developments, and some serious 
objections to withholding remain. Doernberg’s argument that 
withholding violates the annual accounting principle is not without 
merit.220 However, this objection relates to paying taxes in advance, not 
to withholding specifically. A system of estimated tax payments, in 
which a taxpayer unwittingly overpays in the beginning of the year, has 
the same flaw in that the taxpayer cannot obtain a refund of her 
overpayment until she files her tax return the following year. These 
concerns are outweighed by the government’s need to ensure a timely 
 
 220 See Doernberg, supra note 8, at 622-23. 
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revenue stream, which is why we currently require quarterly payments 
in the absence of withholding. 
It is also true, as Doernberg notes, that taxpayers do not earn interest 
on their refunds, which imposes additional costs.221 It is unclear, 
though, how this interest cost balances against the psychological costs 
of owing money and fearing penalties. Empirical studies indicate that, 
in other settings, individuals are willing to forego interest in order to 
avoid owing money. If lack of interest were a serious concern, Congress 
could always require that taxpayers did earn interest on tax refunds. 
The cost to the government may very well be worth the compliance 
benefit of withholding. As to Doernberg’s argument that withholding 
reduces savings, empirical studies indicate this is far from certain and 
that, in fact, tax refunds produced by withholding may facilitate 
savings.222 
At least one serious object to withholding remains, however. Making 
taxes less painful likely does cause people to pay less attention to them. 
This could give too much taxing power to the government overall (as 
Friedman feared), but it also may result in a less progressive tax system. 
For example, one reason that Congress likely relies so heavily on payroll 
taxes is that they are less salient than income tax rates. And even under 
the proposals for expanding withholding discussed below, wealthy 
individuals earning capital gains will continue to avoid withholding. At 
the same time, increased withholding and quasi-withholding may 
empower the government to further raise taxes on lower-income 
taxpayers, and they may face fewer political obstacles. 
In a worst-case scenario, expanded withholding would “numb” the 
taxpaying public to the government’s tax policies and make the tax 
system opaque and undemocratic.223 There is good reason, however, to 
doubt this end result would come to pass if we expanded withholding 
and/or quasi-withholding. First, making taxes salient and 
psychologically painful is not equivalent to transparency. Just because 
taxpayers do not pay attention to taxes, does not mean that they cannot 
easily discover what rules apply to them.224 Withholding does nothing 
to mask the substantive tax rules, such as rates or what sources of 
income are subject to tax. Withholding makes it easier for taxpayers to 
 
 221 See id. at 606. 
 222 See generally supra notes 213-214 and accompanying text (discussing 
withholdings as a forced savings mechanism). 
 223 Goldberg, supra note 48. 
 224 See Schenk, supra note 145, at 285 (“The argument for using low-salience taxes 
is that they make raising revenue palatable to the citizenry — not that the citizenry 
should be tricked.”). 
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choose not to confront the tax rules that apply to them, but does not 
necessarily make those rules harder to find or understand.  
Second, there is little evidence that making individual taxes more 
painful would result in better tax policies for individual taxpayers. 
While Congress continues to rely on low salience mechanisms to 
impose taxes on individuals,225 the dominant reforms in the recent Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 applied to businesses and were no doubt 
motivated by political pressure from the business sector.226 Like many 
other areas of the law, the tax law has a long history of catering to 
corporations and special interest groups, often at the expense of 
individuals.227 So while making taxes more painful may stir more anger 
and resentment among individual taxpayers, it is unclear whether 
increased anger would produce more favorable tax rules. 
On the other hand, much good could come from “numbing” the pain 
of paying taxes, and such good might outweigh transparency concerns. 
By eliminating burdensome compliance requirements for taxpayers, 
withholding would reduce wasteful social costs imposed by the current 
system. Withholding would also likely reduce taxpayer’s negative 
perceptions about the tax system in general, particularly its complexity. 
Positive attitudes towards the system might, in turn, spill over to higher 
compliance overall, resulting in more tax revenue for the government 
and a fairer tax system.  
 
 225 For example, the 2017 tax reform bill reduced individual income tax rates until 
2026, but Congress also switched the method by which tax brackets are adjusted for 
inflation. The new, faster inflation adjustment will bump taxpayers into higher tax 
brackets sooner than they would have under the old method, which amounts to a 
(stealthy) tax increase. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11002, 
131 Stat. 2054 (2017); see also Howard Gleckman, The Hidden Tax Increase in the Big 
Six Tax Outline, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/ 
taxvox/hidden-tax-increase-big-six-tax-outline. 
 226 For example, while tax rate cuts to individuals are temporary (expiring in 2026), 
the corporate tax rate reduction (from 35 percent to 21 percent) is permanent, as are 
changes to the international corporate tax regime. See Preliminary Details and Analysis 
of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, TAX FOUND. (Dec. 18, 2017), https://taxfoundation.org/ 
final-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-details-analysis/.  
 227 For a description of how special interest groups successfully lobbied to obtain 
favorable treatment under the newly enacted pass-through deduction (section 199A of 
the Code), see Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Osofsky, Legislation and Comment: The Making of the 
§ 199A Regulations, EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3277672. 
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B. Expanding Withholding: Where and How 
This Section argues that withholding should be expanded to other 
sources of income besides wages. It first discusses the general 
circumstances in which withholding is beneficial and proposes basing 
non-employee withholding obligations on the economic profile of the 
payer.228 Specifically, withholding could be required any time a payer of 
a certain size (based on income) makes a business-related payment to 
an individual payee. It then identifies specific scenarios — for example, 
gig economy workers — where withholding could be expanded.  
1. General Principles 
Recall that the cost of withholding by larger payers is often smaller 
than the cost of individual payees remitting their own taxes because the 
payer will have declining marginal costs for each additional worker. 
Thus, a scenario that involves a single payer transacting with multiple 
payees is likely a good candidate for withholding from a cost-benefit 
perspective. Further, a payer that pays multiple individuals is more 
likely to have invested in payroll software, which makes withholding 
cheaper as well. Payers with more financial resources may also be more 
likely to invest in payroll software regardless of how many payees they 
have.  
The converse is also true. When a payer transacts with a single payee, 
particularly one of equal size and sophistication, there are less likely to 
be compliance cost savings through withholding. Consider, for 
example, a scenario where a homeowner pays a contractor to build her 
a fence. If the homeowner does not otherwise have employees, she likely 
does not have software in place already to handle payroll and 
withholding obligations. If a withholding obligation were imposed on 
the homeowner with respect to the contractor’s taxes, her costs for 
withholding and making quarterly remittances would likely be at least 
as much as the costs of having the contractor remit taxes directly. 
Further, having to transfer tax information from the contractor to the 
homeowner would likely make withholding slightly more expensive if 
 
 228 There is an argument that all withholding should be conditioned on the size of 
the payer, which would reduce the importance of the employer/independent contractor 
distinction. However, repealing the current withholding rules for employees would be 
a much more radical change to the tax law than simply expanding withholding to 
include some non-employees. It would also take withholding away from some 
employees (like household employees or employees of very small businesses) who 
currently enjoy it. Thus, this Article does not advocate for such a change but rather 
suggests leaving the current employee withholding rules in place. 
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their compliance costs were otherwise equal. The IRS would also not 
save audit and other enforcement costs from having the homeowner 
remit taxes instead of the contactor.  
Withholding in the homeowner-contractor scenario is also less likely 
to reduce tax evasion. Although a framing benefit would exist if the 
contractor were overwithheld, there is more likelihood of collusion in 
this scenario. If the homeowner’s payment is a nondeductible personal 
expense, she has little personal incentive to report it (other than fear of 
penalties).229 The contractor, of course, has an incentive to have the 
homeowner not report the payment to the IRS. The two might thus 
agree that the contractor will charge slightly less to build the fence in 
return for the homeowner not reporting the payment.  
In sum, withholding is most likely to be beneficial when payers: 
(1) have more financial resources; (2) transact with multiple payees; 
and (3) make payments in a business, rather than personal, capacity.  
Which payees benefit most from withholding? Lower-income payees 
are the most likely to experience budgeting and liquidity issues that 
often make it hard to pay taxes in the absence of withholding.230 These 
taxpayers are more likely to have trouble paying estimated tax penalties, 
as well, even if those penalties are small. Younger and less-experienced 
taxpayers are also more likely to have difficulty dealing with estimated 
taxes, although this likely dissipates with age and experience.231 
Empirical research indicates that taxpayers with unpredictable 
income streams are more likely to prefer withholding, as well. There is 
an irony here, because the taxpayers with the most predictable income 
— salaried employees — pay taxes through withholding while 
independent contractors with less steady income streams do not. But 
there is an administrative explanation for this: it is far easier to develop 
and administer a withholding regime for taxpayers who have 
predictable income.232 Yet those with variable income are the taxpayers 
for whom making estimated tax payments is particularly painful, 
because uncertainty appears to have a high psychological cost.233 
 
 229 In contrast, an employer has an incentive to report wage payments because wages 
are deductible business expenses. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2018). Thus, collusion is less 
likely. See Lederman, supra note 78, at 729-30.  
 230 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 5, at 1437. 
 231 For example, empirical research shows that older and more experienced 
taxpayers are more likely to keep separate mental accounts for taxes. See Muehlbacher 
et al., supra note 152, at 135.  
 232 See Thomas, supra note 5, at 1446. 
 233 See generally Bobek et al., supra note 180, at 109 (describing the potential 
emotional benefits arising from overpaying).  
  
130 University of California, Davis [Vol. 53:81 
Numerous studies indicate that taxpayers fear owing large balances to 
the IRS that they potentially cannot pay, and prefer to overpay, even at 
a premium, as opposed to having an uncertain liability. On the other 
hand, workers with steady income streams who can predict their tax 
liability can likely manage estimated tax payments more easily. 
In sum, withholding is most likely to be beneficial when payees: 
(1) have fewer financial resources; (2) are less financially savvy; and 
(3) have unpredictable income streams. As discussed further below, this 
makes withholding particularly attractive for gig economy workers and 
other low-income independent contractors. 
2. Base Withholding Requirements on Profile of the Payer 
With the above principles in mind, policymakers should condition 
non-employee withholding obligations on the profile of the payer to 
ensure that the withholding is most likely to be cost-effective. In brief, 
withholding should be required whenever a business above a certain 
size pays multiple individuals and when there is already an obligation 
to issue a Form 1099.  
First, outside of the context of employment, individual payers should 
not be required to withhold when they make a payment in their 
personal capacity. Rather, withholding obligations should be limited to 
business-related payments only. Individuals making payments in their 
personal capacity are less likely to have invested in payroll software and 
are more likely to have to undertake expensive investments to manage 
withholding obligations. Individuals also tend to make multiple, often 
small, one-off payments for personal purposes. For example, it would 
be burdensome and inefficient to require individuals to withhold taxes 
every time they purchased an item for personal consumption such as a 
meal or a household product.  
Limiting withholding to payers who make payments in a business, 
rather than personal, capacity is consistent with the rules for issuing 
Form 1099s to independent contractors, which requires business 
payments of $600 or more to be reported but not payments made in a 
personal capacity.234 The same parameters, including the $600 
threshold, should apply to withholding; keeping the withholding and 
information reporting rules consistent reduces complexity and 
compliance burdens. Further, in the same way that information 
 
 234 See 26 U.S.C. § 6041(a) (2019). Certain other limitations also apply; for example, 
information reporting is not required for payments for goods or payments made to a 
corporation. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 2019 INSTRUCTIONS 
FOR FORM 1099-MISC 7 (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1099msc.pdf. 
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reporting is not required for payments to corporations, withholding 
should be limited to payments made to individuals, rather than 
corporations or other entities.235 Entities may have withholding 
obligations of their own on the same transaction and, presumably, 
individuals conducting business through an entity are better equipped 
to manage tax obligations.236  
Information reporting requirements are generally based on the type 
of payment made, regardless of the economic profile of the payer. In the 
case of withholding, however, policymakers should consider basing the 
requirements on the size of the payer and the number of payees. 
Withholding could be limited to those payers who have a minimum 
dollar amount of gross business receipts, for example, $100,000. This 
would ensure that very small businesses, for whom withholding might 
be particularly costly, would not be required to withhold. Larger 
businesses over a certain earnings threshold would have more resources 
to handle withholding obligations, whether it be through software or a 
payroll company.  
Additionally, withholding obligations could be limited to only those 
payers that make payments to a certain minimum number of payees. 
For example, withholding could only be required of businesses making 
taxable payments to at least 10 individuals during the tax year.237 This 
would ensure that withholding requirements are imposed in situations 
where payers are likely to have declining marginal costs, and avoided 
where payers and payees might incur similar costs. 
3. Make Withholding Optional, But Make It the Default 
Part III made the case that, for many taxpayers, withholding would 
enhance welfare because of individuals’ preferences for small, advanced 
payments and a general aversion to large lump-sum debts. However, 
preferences are undoubtedly heterogeneous and some taxpayers may 
prefer paying estimated taxes and deferring their obligations as long as 
possible. They may rationally prefer to invest their funds and earn 
interest, rather than extending an interest-free loan to the government. 
Policymakers could take this heterogeneity into account by allowing 
 
 235 See Thomas, supra note 5, at 1444-45. 
 236 See id.  
 237 This would be relatively easy for the IRS to monitor by tracking Form 1099s; any 
business (exceeding the earnings threshold) that issued at least 10 Forms 1099-MISC 
or 1099-K would also be required to withhold.  
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non-employee taxpayers the option to increase or reduce their rate of 
withholding or opt out of withholding altogether.238 
Although payees should have some freedom in determining the 
extent of their withholding, policymakers should set default 
withholding rates. Defaults could be determined in several ways. One 
method would be to solicit information from the payee designed to 
determine his marginal tax bracket, and then estimate his tax liability 
on that basis.239 For example, the payee could check a box on a form 
estimating his net income for the year based on a range of choices, 
where each income range would correspond to a marginal income tax 
bracket.240 The choice of income tax bracket would then help determine 
the appropriate withholding rate. Another option, which would be less 
accurate but simpler, would be to choose one, fixed default withholding 
rate applicable to all payees.241  
The default withholding rate could be based on: (1) an average 
income tax rate that would apply to all payees; (2) the self-employment 
tax rate (always 15.3 percent),242 and (3) a presumed percentage of each 
gross payment that represents taxable net income. For example, 
policymakers might presume that 40 percent of any gross business 
payment represents net profit (meaning that 60 percent represents 
deductible business expenses).243 They might further assume that the 
average income tax rate for individuals engaged in a business is 15 
percent. Self-employment taxes, which are the same rate for all 
 
 238 In theory, all taxpayers could be given the option to opt out of withholding. 
However, it would be wise to limit this opt-out to non-employees for the time being. 
First, employee withholding is well-established and has a good track record, so altering 
that regime may be viewed as risky and politically unpopular. See supra note 41 and 
accompanying text (99 percent compliance rate for employees). Second, there is a 
stronger justification to give non-employees more flexibility when it comes to 
withholding because they are at a significantly higher risk of being overwithheld. See 
Thomas, supra note 5, at 1446 (observing that it is harder to calculate withholding 
accurately for non-employees).  
 239 For a detailed discussion on how policymakers could estimate withholding rates 
based on projected income, see Thomas, supra note 5, at 1447-50. 
 240 Such a form would be as simple as, or likely simpler than, the Form W-4 filled 
out by employees. See id. at 1451. 
 241 For a proposal based on three possible rates, see Alastair Fitzpayne, Shelly 
Steward & Ethan Pollack, Tax Simplification for Independent Workers, ASPEN INST. (Sept. 
2018), https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2018/09/Tax-Simplification-for-
Independent-Workers_September-2018_Aspen-Institute-Future-of-Work-Initiative.pdf. 
 242 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, TOPIC NO. 554, SELF-
EMPLOYMENT TAX (2019), https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc554.html. 
 243 See Thomas, supra note 5, at 1447-48 (discussing IRS data showing that average 
profit ratios for small sole proprietors are approximately 40 percent and proposing 
withholding calculated on that basis). 
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taxpayers, are also roughly 15 percent, making the combined tax rate 
(income tax plus self-employment tax) equal to 30 percent in this 
example. Combining these three factors, a default fixed withholding 
rate might be set at 12 percent (40 percent times 30 percent).  
For example, if a sole proprietor were paid $1,000, the default 
withholding regime would assume that $400 of the payment 
represented taxable income, and $600 represented deductible expenses. 
If $400 were taxable at an income rate of 15 percent, plus an additional 
15 percent of self-employment tax, the sole proprietor would owe $120 
of tax. Withholding 12 percent of her gross payment of $1,000 would 
collect the correct amount.  
Even if a default withholding rate is set relatively low, some taxpayers 
will be overwithheld. For example, a taxpayer may have no net taxable 
income because his expenses exceeded his gross receipts, or because his 
net income did not exceed the standard deduction. Some taxpayers may 
prefer overwithholding as it will provide a tax refund. For other 
taxpayers, overwithholding may create liquidity problems. A taxpayer 
who is living paycheck to paycheck may not be able to afford her bills 
if she is making extraneous tax payments.  
Allowing taxpayers to opt to lower their withholding, or to opt out of 
withholding altogether, would address these liquidity concerns.244 
Taxpayers who expect to net little or no income could simply elect, 
when they filled out their initial tax forms with the payer, to reduce 
their withholding by checking a box on the form. 
One potential risk with letting taxpayers opt out of withholding is 
that they may choose to do so to evade their tax obligations. However, 
this risk should be somewhat mitigated by the fact that such taxpayers 
will still be subject to information reporting. Taxpayers may be less 
inclined to intentionally underreport if they know that their income will 
be reported to the IRS in any event.  
However, even if taxpayers do not opt out of withholding with the 
intention to commit evasion, there is still a risk that taxpayers will opt 
out, fail to budget property, and be unable to make timely tax payments. 
If policymakers view this is a significant risk, they could simply set a 
floor on withholding. The floor would be lower than the default rate, 
 
 244 Reducing withholding would help taxpayers on a prospective basis. However, 
taxpayers who didn’t realize they would experience liquidity problems from 
withholding would not be able to claim a refund of overwithheld taxes until the 
following year when they filed their tax returns. This is a feature of wage withholding, 
as well. For example, an employee who loses her job mid-year cannot reclaim 
overwithheld taxes until she files her tax return the following year. See Thomas, supra 
note 5, at 1446. 
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but would require some minimum level of withholding. For example, 
the floor might assume a zero percent income tax rate but apply self-
employment taxes. If net profits were assumed to be roughly 40 percent 
of gross payments, withholding for self-employment tax only would 
equate to a withholding rate of 6 percent (15 percent times 40 percent).  
On the flip side, some taxpayers may prefer higher withholding than 
the default. For example, taxpayers for whom default withholding does 
not satisfy their entire year’s tax liability may prefer more withholding 
so as not to owe a balance. These taxpayers should be allowed to opt for 
one of a range of withholding rates that are higher than the default. 
Undoubtedly, some taxpayers will not know how their tax obligations 
relate to default withholding rates, and a period of trial and error may 
be necessary where they adjust their withholding rate after filing an 
income tax return that either resulted in too large of a refund or an 
undesired balance from the taxpayer’s perspective.  
Having the option to tailor withholding to the taxpayer’s personal 
situation is not unlike the current system for wage withholding, which 
allows taxpayers to claim zero or a higher number of “allowances” that 
reduce tax withholding. For example, an employee who desires to be 
overwithheld may intentionally choose zero allowances even though 
she is entitled to claim several.245 The proposal here is even simpler: 
taxpayers could do nothing and be withheld at a default rate or could 
choose a lower rate or a higher rate. Choosing a rate of withholding is 
not an exact science, but it is undoubtedly easier than the allowance 
system. Most taxpayers likely have no understanding of what the actual 
financial implications are — in dollars — of claiming an additional 
allowance on a Form W-4 (for employees). On the other hand, the 
average taxpayer does understand the difference between withholding 
10 percent of her earnings versus 15 percent of her earnings. What’s 
more, independent contractors or other taxpayers who have experience 
paying estimated taxes may already have a rough idea of what 
percentage of their gross income they typically owe in federal taxes. For 
this group, choosing a withholding rate is ideal and can probably be 
done with relative accuracy. On the other hand, this group would 
probably have a much harder time converting this percentage estimate 
into an appropriate amount under an allowance system. 
 
 245 See supra note 32, at 1-2 and accompanying text.  
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4. Withholding on Specific Sources of Income 
a. Independent Contractor Income 
As discussed in Part I, employees are subject to withholding for 
payroll and income taxes, but the Code currently does not provide for 
withholding for workers who are independent contractors. Yet, in some 
cases, withholding would benefit workers, impose only small costs on 
the payers, and would assist the government in collecting taxes.  
Many (though not all) independent contractors work in settings in 
which withholding is ideal, particularly gig economy workers. The 
online platform companies (e.g., Uber or TaskRabbit) are large and 
sophisticated, and already have the payroll infrastructure in place for 
withholding because they also have their own fulltime employees. On 
the other side of the transactions are numerous gig economy workers, 
many who earn relatively low amounts of income and have little 
experience with paying estimated taxes.246 This presents a setting where 
the cost of imposing withholding are likely to be far lower than the 
combined tax compliance burden currently imposed on a high number 
of workers. The government is more likely to collect tax revenue in the 
withholding scenario, as well.  
Independent contractor withholding would not have to be limited to 
the gig economy, however. Withholding requirements could be 
extended to any business that uses independent contractors using the 
parameters described above for determining which payers should be 
required to withhold. Expanding withholding to independent 
contractors would also address one of Doernberg’s principal objections 
to withholding: that the law’s reliance on the employee/independent 
contractor distinction is costly and encourages avoidance.247 If large 
payers were required to withhold in either scenario, the incentive to 
misclassify workers would be lower.248 
 
 246 See Thomas, supra note 5, at 1429. 
 247 See Doernberg, supra note 8, at 610-13 and accompanying text. 
 248 Although this addresses Doernberg’s concerns related to withholding, the 
incentive to misclassify employees remains for other reasons, including avoiding payroll 
tax obligations and various non-tax costs. See, e.g., Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A 
Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: The ‘Independent 
Worker’ 7 (Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper No. 2015-10, 2015), http://www. 
hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_ 
work_krueger_harris.pdf. 
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b. Investment Income  
Another source of income for which there is generally no withholding 
is investment income, such as that received in the form of interest, 
dividends, rents, royalties, and partnership interests. On the one hand, 
compliance for many forms of investment income is already 
exceptionally high. Income like dividends and interest, which is subject 
to substantial information reporting, has a compliance rate of 93 
percent.249 There is certainly an argument that withholding on such 
income simply is not necessary. But when compliance rates are less than 
perfect, the revenue at stake is not necessarily meaningless.  
As an example, consider dividends and interest, both of which are 
subject to substantial information reporting but not withholding. For 
2016, IRS data reveals that taxpayers reported approximately $92 billion 
of taxable interest income and $250 billion of dividend income on their 
tax returns, for a combined amount of $342 billion.250 Since IRS 
compliance data shows that interest and dividend income are 
voluntarily reported at a rate of 93 percent, presumably the actual 
amount of interest and dividend income earned is closer to $368 
billion.251 In other words, the unreported 7 percent of interest and 
dividend income should amount to approximately $26 billion.252 If the 
average tax rate applied to dividend and interest income were 15 
percent (a conservative estimate), the tax at stake for the unreported 7 
percent would be about $4 billion.253 In reality, the effective tax rate is 
likely even higher because preferential tax rates generally do not apply 
to interest income or non-qualified dividends, and high-income 
taxpayers pay a 20 percent tax rate on qualified dividends.254 A 20 
percent tax rate would make the tax at stake over $5 billion.255 
Several billions of dollars in additional tax revenue each year is not 
trivial. Rather than assuming that 93 percent compliance is good 
 
 249 See I.R.S. TAX GAP ESTIMATES, supra note 41, at 5. 
 250 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. 4801, INDIVIDUAL 
INCOME TAX RETURNS LINE ITEM ESTIMATES, 2016 36 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/16inlinecount.pdf (amounts are rounded). 
 251 93 percent x $367.7 billion = $342 billion. 
 252 7 percent x $368 billion = $25.8 billion. 
 253 15 percent x $26 billion = $3.9 billion. 
 254 Rates on qualified dividends are based on capital gains rates. See 26 U.S.C. 
§ 1(h)(11)(B)(i) (2019); 2018 Capital Gains Rates, BRADFORD TAX INST. (2019), 
https://bradfordtaxinstitute.com/Free_Resources/2018-Capital-Gains-Rates.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2019) ($425,800 threshold for 2018 for top capital gains rate applicable 
to single taxpayers). 
 255 20 percent x $26 billion = $5.2 billion. 
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enough, policymakers should consider whether the cost of 
implementing withholding is justified by the benefits, considering the 
revenue at stake. In many cases, dividends, interest income, and other 
investment income are paid out by large financial institutions or other 
payers of significant size. Since these payers are already collecting and 
reporting tax information for their investors, the marginal costs of tax 
withholding may be relatively low. Investors could elect a flat 
withholding rate at the time they provide tax information for their Form 
W-9 (required for Form 1099 reporting). On the other hand, the 
marginal cost to investors themselves of making tax payments on 
investment income is uncertain. To the extent that investors merely 
receive a reduced tax refund or make a small tax payment with their tax 
return, the cost of direct remittance may also be low. On the other hand, 
if a significant portion of investors must make quarterly tax remittances, 
the cost will be higher. The outcome of this cost benefit analysis is 
uncertain without further data, but the inquiry itself should be 
undertaken.256 
5. Offer Inducements for Payers 
Even if third-party remittance is more cost-effective than direct 
remittance, payers will likely balk at having to incur additional costs to 
withhold taxes. While in many circumstances, withholding reduces the 
overall social costs of taxation, it still shifts costs away from both payees 
and the government and onto third parties. To mitigate the resistance 
to withholding, and to compensate payers for this cost, the government 
could offer financial incentives tied to withholding.  
a. Payroll Services and Software 
First, the government could offer free or subsidized online payroll 
services (or payroll software) to help smaller payers manage 
withholding obligations at minimal cost. In an analogous context, low-
income taxpayers are offered free online tax preparation services under 
 
 256 The Taxpayer Advocate recently issued a report on a Pay-As-You-Earn system that 
analyzed the benefits of withholding on interest, pensions, dividends, capital gains 
(reported on Form 1099-B), IRA distributions, and unemployment income. TAXPAYER 
ADVOCATE SERV., A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF PAY-AS-YOU-EARN (PAYE) WITHHOLDING 
SYSTEMS AS A MECHANISM FOR SIMPLIFYING AND IMPROVING U.S. TAX ADMINISTRATION 4 
(2018), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2018-ARC/ARC18_ 
Volume2_01_PAYE.pdf. The report found that expanding withholding to include those 
income sources in addition to wages would cover tax payment obligations for 62 percent 
of tax returns. See id. at 26-27.  
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the IRS’s Free File Alliance Program.257 Under the Free File program, a 
number of tax software companies (e.g., TurboTax, H&R Block) offer 
limited versions of their tax preparation services free of charge, 
accessible through the IRS website. Similarly, the government could 
partner with online payroll companies such as Gusto, OnPay, or Patriot 
Software to provide free payroll software to assist with withholding 
obligations.258  
Alternatively, the government could offer payers a tax credit to cover 
their use of payroll software to deal with withholding obligations. For 
example, a small business owner working with 10 employees would 
incur annual costs of roughly $960 to deal with federal and state tax 
obligations for those employees.259 A family with one household 
employee (e.g., a nanny) would incur annual fees of roughly $500.260 A 
tax credit would compensate taxpayers dollar-for-dollar for all or some 
portion of those costs. For example, a business owner claiming a $100 
tax credit for payroll services would reduce his tax bill by $100.  
Short of offering a credit, the government could at least make payroll 
costs deductible, above the line,261 for all payers. While those who incur 
payroll costs in the course of their trade or business should be able to 
deduct them as a business expense, individuals who withhold for 
personal purposes (e.g., a family that employs a nanny) cannot deduct 
these expenses under current law. Allowing a deduction for the cost of 
payroll software or services would induce individuals to comply with 
their withholding obligations and reduce the cost.  
 
 257 See Free File: Do Your Federal Taxes for Free, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/filing/free-file-do-your-federal-taxes-for-free (last visited July 11, 
2019) (offering free file software for those with incomes below $66,000 for 2018). For 
further description (and critique) of the program, see Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney 
Thomas, Regulating Tax Return Preparation, 58 B.C. L. REV. 151, 165-66 (2017). 
 258 See sources cited supra note 71. Like the Free File program, the benefits could be 
limited to taxpayers with incomes below a certain threshold. See supra note 257 and 
accompanying text. 
 259 Average estimated monthly cost of $80 was calculated using the pricing 
structures of three major online payroll software companies (Gusto, OnPay, and Patriot 
Software). See sources cited supra note 71. 
 260 Estimated annual costs were calculated using the pricing structures of three 
major online payroll software companies (Gusto, OnPay, and Patriot Software). See 
sources cited supra note 71. 
 261 “Above the line” deductions are subtracted from gross income in computing 
adjusted gross income and are generally allowed in full. See 26 U.S.C. § 62 (2019). 
“Below the line” deductions are generally subject to restrictions, for example, most 
cannot be claimed unless taxpayers itemize their deductions rather than claiming the 
standard deduction. See 26 U.S.C. § 63(a)-(b) (2019). 
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For example, consider a married couple with a 25 percent tax rate 
who spends $200 per year on payroll software to deal with tax 
withholding obligations for their childcare provider. A $200 deduction 
for this software cost would offer the couple a benefit worth $50.262  
b. Payer Credits 
Instead of directly subsidizing the compliance costs related to 
withholding, such as providing free payroll services, the government 
could offer payers a credit for a portion of the tax withheld.263 For 
payers making nondeductible payments (e.g., an individual who pays a 
nanny), this credit would be the first and only tax benefit they receive 
for withholding. For those making deductible business payments (e.g., 
compensation paid to an independent contractor working for a 
business), the credit would be provided in addition to the business 
deduction under section 162.264 The business deduction is allowable for 
any business payment made to an independent contractor regardless of 
whether withholding is present. But the credit would only be provided 
when taxes are withheld. The credit could be a small percentage of the 
tax withheld (e.g., 5 or 10 percent), or it could be a flat dollar amount 
(e.g., $1,000). The purpose of the credit would be both to induce 
withholding and to compensate payers for the compliance costs. 
As a simple example, consider a corporation that pays an independent 
contractor $10,000 per year. Further assume the contractor’s tax 
liability on that income is $1,000. In the absence of withholding, there 
are a number of reasons that the contractor might not report and pay 
the full $1,000. She might purposefully evade the obligation (especially 
if she is not issued a Form 1099), she might inflate her deductions to 
avoid owing the tax (even if she does receive a Form 1099),265 or she 
might simply fail to budget properly and lack the funds to make the 
payment. In many common scenarios, the government will fail to collect 
$1,000. It may collect a smaller amount, $500 for example, or it may 
collect zero. On the other hand, if the government requires the 
 
 262 $200 deduction x 25 percent tax rate = $50.  
 263 Analogously, many states offer discounts to retailers on sales tax due, if those 
taxes are paid on time. Such “vendor discounts” range from 0.5 percent to 5 percent. 
See Scott Peterson, Which States Offer the Best Incentives for Filing Sales Tax on Time?, 
AVALARA (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.avalara.com/us/en/blog/2016/12/states-offer-
best-incentives-filing-sales-tax-time.html; see also Slemrod, supra note 20, at 264. 
 264 See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
 265 See Joel Slemrod et al., Does Credit-Card Information Reporting Improve Small-
Business Tax Compliance?, 149 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 18-19 (2017). 
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corporation to withhold a sufficient amount, it is highly likely that the 
government will collect all $1,000 of tax owed.  
This suggests that, at least for payees who are likely to underpay in 
the absence of withholding, the government could cede some of the 
revenue collected to payers and still come out ahead. Consider a payer 
credit equal to 10 percent of the tax withheld, for example. In the case 
of the contractor who has $1,000 of tax withheld, the payer receives a 
$100 credit from the government. Thus, $900 in tax revenue goes to the 
government and $100 goes to the payer, while the contractor has paid 
the same amount of tax as without a credit. The payer is now 
compensated for its collection costs, yet the government has still come 
out ahead having collected $900 as compared to when there was no 
withholding at all. Of course, this stylized example does not accurately 
describe the cost-benefit analysis for withholding in all circumstances. 
However, it is intended to illustrate the fact that compensating payers 
may be a “win-win” scenario if, on balance, the additional tax collected 
from withholding outweighs the cost of such compensation.266  
c. Scope of Subsidies  
Should all payers receive subsidies for withholding costs? On the one 
hand, offering subsidies to anyone who withholds, including 
employers, would be expensive. Consider the amount of revenue at 
stake, for example, if the government offered withholding credits to 
large employers like Walmart. It may also be inefficient to offer 
subsidies to employers who are already withholding and presumably 
have already incurred the start-up costs of doing so.  
On the other hand, limiting subsidies to non-employers makes 
independent contractor characterization more attractive and may 
encourage people to misclassify their employees. However, it is doubtful 
that withholding subsidies would have much impact, as the incentives 
to classify workers as independent contractors are already so great even 
without additional subsidies.267 However, even if limiting subsidies will 
not distort behavior, the public may perceive a fairness issue if the 
government offers subsidies to one group of businesses (those that hire 
independent contractors) but not another (those that hire employees). 
 
 266 The payer’s compliance costs would also have to be factored into the cost-benefit 
analysis, as would the reduced compliance costs of the payee. 
 267 Among other benefits, hiring independent contractors allows payers to avoid 
payroll tax obligations, labor and employment laws, and providing certain benefits like 
healthcare. See Harris & Krueger, supra note 248, at 7. 
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One way to address this problem would be to offer withholding 
subsidies to all types of payers, regardless of whether the payers hire 
employees or independent contractors, but only to those payers below 
a certain earnings threshold. For example, any business earning less 
than $500,000 of receipts could be entitled to free payroll software that 
would handle withholding obligations, and all larger businesses would 
be excluded. This would mitigate potential revenue loss while 
minimizing any distortions or fairness concerns. 
C. Quasi-Withholding 
With the rise of technology, the private market has made it 
increasingly easy and inexpensive for payers to deal with tax 
withholding obligations. Businesses that use payroll software to 
compensate employees can often add on tax withholding and 
information reporting at minor additional cost.268 Yet, for workers who 
must remit their own taxes, it does not appear the private market has 
successfully offered the same level of ease. Many independent 
contractors have a hard time estimating their taxes, in part, because 
their income stream is unpredictable. This lack of predictability makes 
withholding harder to implement; yet individuals with unpredictable 
tax liability are the ones most likely to prefer overpayment and may find 
paying taxes to be particular painful.269 
In cases when withholding is not feasible — because it is too costly, 
too difficult to calculate, or simply politically infeasible — policymakers 
could instead focus on ways to emulate the benefits of withholding. 
Recall that taxpayers generally like withholding because taxes are 
subtracted before the person gets paid, it breaks tax liability into many 
small payments, and it often results in overpayments; all of these things 
reduce the pain of paying and appear to enhance utility. Withholding 
also helps taxpayers overcome liquidity issues (from failing to 
adequately save for taxes) and ensures the government collects tax in a 
timely manner. In the absence of true third-party withholding by the 
payer, taxpayers and the government might benefit from an approach 
that tries to mimic withholding, what this Article refers to as “quasi-
withholding.”  
Quasi-withholding would introduce a third party between the payer 
and payee to facilitate tax payments. The third party could be the 
taxpayer’s bank or a private entity designed to assist with making tax 
payments. The purpose of the third-party services would be to invoke 
 
 268 See sources cited, supra note 68. 
 269 See Schulz et al., supra note 164, at 248. 
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the benefits of withholding without imposing the obligation directly on 
the payer.  
What would quasi-withholding look like? Consider the example of a 
taxpayer that drives for Uber whose bank facilitates quasi-
withholding.270 The taxpayer might open up a separate checking 
account at her bank into which she would direct deposit payments from 
Uber. The taxpayer could agree with her bank that a set percentage of 
every deposit she makes into her business account would be 
automatically deducted by the bank and set aside for taxes. The 
percentage could be based on a suggested schedule tied to her estimated 
earnings, but the taxpayer would have the option to adjust the 
percentage. The bank could automatically withdraw the tax payment 
every time she made a deposit. On a quarterly (or more frequent) basis, 
the bank could also make a tax payment to the IRS on the taxpayer’s 
behalf.  
The taxpayer would not have to expend time or effort to make tax 
payments nor would she have to budget for taxes. Further, when she 
checked her account balance or withdrew money from her business 
account, she would know the funds represent her net after-tax earnings. 
This might mitigate or eliminate the endowment effect and make the 
experience of paying taxes less painful overall. If she were otherwise 
inclined to overspend her funds or make late tax payments, this too 
would be mitigated. She could also deliberately err on the side of 
overpayment so that she could claim a refund, if she so wished. 
While the private market would be in the best position to facilitate 
quasi-withholding, the government could promote its use in many of 
the same ways it could incentivize withholding (discussed above). The 
government could partner directly with third parties who could assist 
with quasi-withholding, or it could subsidize the use of third-party 
services through credits or deductions. Additionally, the IRS could 
promote the use of quasi-withholding through its website and other 
forms of taxpayer outreach.  
Why hasn’t the private market already solved the problem of tax 
complexity on its own?271 One answer may be that the solutions offered 
by the market are too costly without government intervention. 
Researching and signing up for an online service imposes decision costs 
on taxpayers that they may wish to avoid, in addition to the fees charged 
 
 270 While banks would have easy direct access to taxpayers’ funds, other third-party 
businesses formed specifically for this purpose could also facilitate quasi-withholding. 
 271 A related question is, has the private market already solved the problem? 
Empirical studies would suggest it has not. See Bruckner, supra note 101, at 17. 
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for the services.272 Yet the use of private parties to assist with tax 
obligations creates positive externalities: the government benefits if 
more tax is paid. If the government offers subsidies, this would allow 
taxpayers to capture some of that benefit, which would make quasi-
withholding more attractive. Put more simply, a taxpayer is more likely 
to rely on quasi-withholding through a private business if the IRS 
advertises it and promises a tax incentive in exchange. 
The economic analysis for subsidizing quasi-withholding is the same 
as that for withholding. Expending government funds (e.g., a credit to 
cover costs of a third-party service) may result in more tax collected 
overall, while simultaneously reducing the burden of compliance for 
taxpayers. Thus, there is good reason for the government to take an 
active role in promoting the use of quasi-withholding, rather than 
hoping taxpayers will incur the costs on their own.  
CONCLUSION 
The current U.S. tax withholding regime has been in place since the 
Second World War. For decades, we have retained a system that 
requires virtually no effort of employees, but imposes burdensome 
compliance costs on non-employees. For much of the twentieth 
century, this system made sense because the costs of withholding were 
simply too great in many circumstances. But the internet and other 
advances in technology have changed the calculus. Using software and 
online programs, many independent workers could now benefit from 
withholding or quasi-withholding at low cost to payers. 
Policymakers could take an important step towards modernizing the 
tax system by doing away with the rule that tax withholding is not 
required outside of the employment context. A rule that instead 
conditions withholding on the economic profile of the payer would 
ensure withholding was imposed in situations when it would be most 
efficient, while vastly simplifying the tax system for many independent 
workers. What’s more, behavioral science research demonstrates that 
paying taxes through withholding would make navigating the tax 
system less painful for many individuals. At the same time, expanding 
 
 272 It is possible that private parties would eventually offer quasi-withholding 
services for free if they were linked to other services. For example, a bank might offer 
quasi-withholding services to entice customers to open a checking and savings account 
at the bank. Further, banks could earn income from the use of taxpayers’ funds between 
the time they were collected through quasi-withholding and the time the estimated 
payments were made to the IRS. The income earned on taxpayers’ funds might provide 
enough compensation for the quasi-withholding services that financial institutions 
would be willing to offer them without fees.  
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withholding would result in more tax revenue collected for the 
government. The potential benefits to both taxpayers and the 
government make this a uniquely attractive tax reform option. 
